

CURRENT *History* A MONTHLY MAGAZINE OF WORLD AFFAIRS

OCTOBER 1962

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CURRENT History

OCTOBER, 1962

VOL. 43, NO. 254

In the seven articles that follow, specialists evaluate the progress the Soviet Union is making and the problems it faces today and tomorrow. One of the keys to Soviet foreign policy in the 1960's is the authority of Nikita Khrushchev. Our first article explores the limits of Khrushchev's power. "While Khrushchev commands the levers of power and possesses supreme authority, . . . he is not the autocrat the world came to know by the end of Stalin's reign."

Khrushchev's Limited Dictatorship

By MYRON RUSH

The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California

“JUST NOW you asked me whether everything in our country was decided by one person.” The question was addressed to Stalin by Emil Ludwig in 1931, when he already was widely regarded as a dictator, and was so in fact.¹ Nevertheless, Stalin still employed consultative procedures, not only within the higher party bodies, the Politburo and Central Committee, but also outside them; members of these bodies still felt free to vote against Stalin on important questions, and Stalin did not insist that his view prevail against their preponderant opinion. Yet the final power of decision was his if he chose to exercise it. Stalin's rule in 1931 was rightly called a dictatorship, for members of these supreme bodies had been chosen by him, and he did not hesitate to remove these

officials if their opposition became intolerable.

In his reply to Ludwig's question, Stalin said: “Never under any circumstances would our workers now tolerate power in the hands of one person.”² If “power in the hands of one person” signifies a ruler with absolute power of decision, one who is unconstrained by proximate political pressures, then Stalin at that time was not such a ruler. He was limited by the force of strongly held opinion in the regime's councils, and by his fear of imperiling the regime's stability by enforcing his will on certain questions. Within a few years, however, Stalin succeeded in giving the lie to his own contention that Soviet “workers” would not tolerate “power in the hands of one person.” But to seize unlimited power, he had to carry out a political revolution, to purge many thousands of leaders that he himself had brought to power in the decade after Lenin's death.

The difference between Stalin's dictatorial power in 1931 and his unlimited, or autocratic, power in 1938 is a crucial dif-

¹ Copyright, 1962, The RAND Corporation. Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors.

² Stalin, “Talk with . . . Emil Ludwig,” *Works*, Vol. 13, p. 113.

ference that we must understand if we are to assess Khrushchev's political power in 1962. Khrushchev's present position is in no sense comparable to Stalin's in 1938 and thereafter; his power can only be compared with Stalin's in 1931, which it in fact resembles. The resemblance is partly a consequence of the similar paths taken by the two men in their rise to power during periods of succession crises.

1. A commanding position in the Party Secretariat was secured and employed to control the Party machine, or administrative apparatus.

2. This made it possible to control the Party's elective machinery and to make patronage appointments, even to the very high positions which usually brought membership in the Central Committee.

3. By determining the membership of the Central Committee, it was possible to dominate its elected executive organ (called until 1952 the Politburo, thereafter the Presidium). Stalin had completed this ascent to personal dictatorship by 1930; Khrushchev, deliberately following in Stalin's footsteps, attained a similar power by 1958. The result in each case was to resolve a serious succession crisis and to stabilize Soviet politics.

The system of rule established by Stalin (and later re-established by Khrushchev) differed significantly from the one that had preceded the crisis. The principal change was to confer sovereignty on the Party machine.³ The Party's full-time functionaries, who work in secretariats on all Party echelons, were given the chief role in policy-making as well as control over

all other institutions in Soviet society, notably the government, economic bureaucracy, political police and the army.⁴

By concentrating political power in a single, highly centralized and disciplined institution which allowed some scope for the exercise of initiative, this system proved an effective instrument for carrying out both social revolution, under Stalin, and social reform, under Khrushchev. Relying on the Party machine, Stalin was able in the early 1930's to initiate rapid industrialization and to collectivize agriculture within a few years. Khrushchev, also ruling through the Party machine, succeeded in maintaining a rapid rate of industrial growth while radically reorganizing the administration of the economy, effecting a substantial improvement in the condition of agriculture, and carrying out an urgently needed housing program.

However, the system of personal rule through the Party machine also has important disadvantages. By basing his rule on a single sovereign institution, the dictator is deprived of the pervasive personal control that can be obtained by means of a system of mutual surveillance by functionaries on all levels; he is compelled to depend on the competence and loyalty of his subordinates in the sovereign party machine. Thus in the early years of his rule Stalin met with occasional defiance or covert opposition from his chief lieutenants and provincial satraps, and on the lower levels his commands did not always meet with a full response.

To overcome these disadvantages of a rule based on a sovereign institution, Stalin undertook to deprive the Party machine of its sovereignty, to establish instead an intricate system of institutional balances and checks in which the political police had a key role, a system of which he alone was the master. He accomplished this during the "great purge," 1936-1938. It is noteworthy that the principal object of the great purge was *not* to give the Soviet regime totalitarian control over society, which it had already acquired by means of

³ As founder of the Communist party and the Soviet State, Lenin was accorded preeminent authority even without the developed apparatus of personal dictatorship which Stalin and Khrushchev found necessary. He ruled through a diffuse but hierarchical system of Party committees.

⁴ The party machine, which numbers between two and three hundred thousand, must be distinguished from the hierarchy of Party "committees" and their executive "bureaus," which include representatives of institutions other than the Party machine; it must further be distinguished from the Party's membership as a whole, numbering almost ten million.

"the revolution from above"; it was rather to give Stalin autocratic power in the Soviet regime. Its result was to secure Stalin's will from challenge in the remaining decade and a half of his reign.

IS KHRUSHCHEV A DICTATOR?

Khrushchev, too, has had cause to observe the disadvantages of exercising personal dictatorship through a single sovereign agency of rule. The difficulties he has encountered, and his efforts to cope with them, have given rise to the widespread view in the West that Khrushchev is no dictator, but heads the Soviet regime only at the sufferance of his colleagues.⁵

The chief difficulty in this view is that one cannot readily identify the group of colleagues, or the oligarchical body, to whom Khrushchev is supposed to be responsible. Such a body would need a stable membership; new members would have to be chosen by co-option, but at a slow rate so as not to dilute or undermine the power of the original members. Actually, the Party Presidium *was* such an oligarchy, or "collective leadership," in the years 1953–1957. Of the ten men who made up the Presidium after Stalin's death, the oligarchy purged one (Beria), who was a threat to the other members by reason of his control over the political police, and added two (Suslov and Kirichenko). The oligarchy was fundamentally unstable, however, being a transitional form of rule during the Stalin succession crisis.⁶ It was overthrown by Khrushchev in 1957; of its members besides Khrushchev, only Suslov and Mikoyan still remain.

⁵ One advocate of this view has put it thus: "Khrushchev is without doubt the top boss, the leader, but he is boss by permission of the others. His colleagues could easily put him down. . . . What follows from this? . . . a top-people democracy." (Edward Crankshaw, "Discussion Inside the Kremlin," *The Atlantic Monthly*, June, 1962.) What Crankshaw calls a top-people democracy is more conventionally called an oligarchy, which is, of course, quite different from a personal dictatorship.

⁶ See my *The Rise of Khrushchev* (Washington, D.C., 1958).

There has been a considerable turnover even of new members during the last half dozen years. Khrushchev's chosen lieutenants have been brought into it, but some were later removed when they incurred his displeasure, either by failing to display the requisite zeal and competence, or by overreaching the limits of their assigned powers. Thus, Kirichenko and Aristov, who occupied powerful posts at the center of the Party machine, were suddenly deprived of their Party offices in 1960. Ignatov, Belyaev, Furtseva and Mukhitdinov, after being in the Presidium for four years, were not re-elected in 1961.

These six leaders were dropped from the Presidium unobtrusively. On the other hand, the seven members of "the anti-Party group" were subjected to strong personal and ideological criticism when they were expelled from the Presidium. This contrasting treatment of Khrushchev's opponents, who opposed his power, and of his lieutenants, who did not justify his confidence, is instructive, for Stalin too maintained such a double standard. When he purged the Politburo of the enemies of his power during the 1920's, he scathingly attacked their ideological and political failings; but when the lieutenants he had himself raised to the Politburo were purged in the 1930's, this was done silently. (As we shall have occasion to observe below, however, the subsequent treatment of their purged lieutenants by Stalin, on the one hand, and by Khrushchev [thus far] on the other, differed markedly.)

As Khrushchev's former favorites are removed, new ones replace them. Since 1960, Podgorny, Polyansky, Voronov, Kirilenko and Kosygin have been added to the Presidium. All but Kosygin were in relatively minor posts when Khrushchev became dictator in 1957, and there is no evidence that any of these five promotions originated otherwise than with him. The Presidium now consists—besides these post-1957 additions, and Khrushchev himself—of two superannuated hacks (Shvernik and Kuusinen), two powerful young figures

who were elected in 1957 (Koslov and Brezhnev) and the above-mentioned hold-overs, Mikoyan and Suslov. It is difficult to suppose that any of these men, or some combination of them, have controlled the composition of the Presidium during the past half dozen years. They, too, seem to owe their positions and authority to Khrushchev.

Some observers, it is true, have supposed that Kozlov or Suslov may lead factions opposed to Khrushchev. Indeed, Kozlov's power is not insignificant, for he is evidently Khrushchev's deputy in charge of an important part of the Party machine.⁷ But that this power is derivative from Khrushchev's is indicated by the fact that Kozlov was only a provincial third secretary when Khrushchev began his rise in 1953. Moreover, his capacity to exercise patronage was limited until May, 1960, when he finally reached the center of power, the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Suslov has praised Khrushchev and followed his lead, except for a brief aberration in 1958.⁸ Although a long-time member of the Sec-

retariat (since 1947) Suslov, an ideological specialist, has in recent years been charged with relations with foreign Communist parties and has not controlled decisive sectors of the *apparat*.

While oligarchy requires stability in the ruling body, the composition of the Presidium, as we have just seen, has been markedly unstable. The same is true of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, which is presumably subordinate to the Presidium.⁹ The 8-man Secretariat elected in June, 1957, had grown to ten members by the end of 1959, but only three of the ten are still secretaries: Khrushchev, Suslov and the octogenarian, Kuusinen. In May, 1960, Khrushchev sharply reduced the size of the Secretariat by depriving members of the Bureau for the Russian R.S.F.S.R.¹⁰ of their places in it. As a result, there now appears to be a division of authority between the Secretaries, who are chiefly responsible for the non-Russian, or minority Republics, and the Bureau for the R.S.F.S.R., which has special authority in the Russian Republic. Only one man sits in both the Secretariat and the Bureau: the First Secretary of the Central Committee and the Chairman of the Bureau for the R.S.F.S.R., N. S. Khrushchev.

What of the Central Committee itself? Is it not possible that this body of several hundred men is the real ruler of Russia, the oligarchy on which the Presidium, the Secretariat, the Bureau, and even the First Secretary depend for their power? It is hard to believe this in view of Khrushchev's dictatorial demeanor at its meetings. (See, for example, the stenographic report of the January, 1961, plenum.) In any case, the Central Committee, which is charged with directing all work of the Party between Congresses, is as much in flux as the executive bodies that it formally elects: around half of the members and candidates elected following the Twentieth Party Congress (1956) were newcomers, as were roughly half of the next Central Committee elected in 1961. Moreover, the new Central Committee's capacity to deliberate was reduced

⁷ Following the Twenty-Second Congress, the new Central Committee elected a Secretariat in which Kozlov's name follows Khrushchev's; the other secretaries are listed alphabetically. Kozlov has not been accorded a title which reflects his position, however, and he remains without membership in the important Bureau for the Russian Republic.

⁸ In two speeches in the spring of 1958 Suslov omitted Khrushchev's name at a time when other Presidium-level speakers made a point of mentioning him.

⁹ According to the party statute (Article 39), the *Presidium* is charged simply with directing the work of the Central Committee between plenums, the *Secretariat*, with directing current work, mainly in selecting cadres and organizing the verification of fulfillment. Moreover, formally, at least, the present statute seems to characterize the *Presidium*, but not the *Secretariat*, as a policy-making body like the Central Committee: "at each regular election the composition of the Central Committee and its *Presidium* is renewed by no less than one-quarter" (Article 25); actually, there may be special, perhaps devious, reasons why the Secretariat is exempted from this provision. Since there is no formal limit on the number of terms served by a Central Committee member, a Secretary of the Central Committee may serve indefinitely without a special dispensation.

¹⁰ This is a body which Khrushchev created in 1956, as part of his plan for strengthening the party machine.

by making it almost half again as large as its predecessor.

Finally, then, may not the Congress of the C.P.S.U., which chose new Central Committees in 1952, 1956 and 1961, be the sovereign body that we have been searching for? There is a decisive objection to this hypothesis. The Party statute formally grants the Central Committee the power to establish norms of representation for the Congress. In accordance with the norms applied in 1956, less than 1400 voting delegates were chosen; the norms used in 1961 produced three times as many. Clearly, a political body which is entitled to meet only once every four years and whose size is so elastic could hardly be the sovereign body in the Soviet system.

We are forced to conclude that none of these bodies constitutes the oligarchy to whom Khrushchev is supposed to be subject. All are evidently subject to Khrushchev, being constituted according to his will; which is to say, again, that Khrushchev is dictator.

The new Party statute adopted at the Twenty-Second Congress has not only legitimized a large turnover in the Party's bodies, but has gone so far as to make it mandatory. Even so, only one-fourth of the membership of the top bodies has to be replaced at each new election, rather than almost one-half as happened the last two times. According to Frol Kozlov, these provisions were included to ensure that the collective did not lose control over individual members.¹¹ Their effect, how-

ever, is to make members of the *apparatus* even less secure than they were: now they must *earn* the privilege of remaining in their posts, rather than, as before, having only to avoid the adverse criticism that would bring their removal. Moreover, since exceptionally authoritative leaders are exempted from the provisions which limit members of Party committees to three terms, it seems likely that control by the dictator, rather than by "the collective," has been strengthened.¹²

What has been true of top party bodies has been even truer of Party chiefs on lower echelons. Only one-eighth of provincial (*oblast* and *krai*) first secretaries have held office since 1957, and less than one-third since 1959. Kozlov, who gives these figures, introduces them with the remark: "Those who are unable to keep in step with the times and who persist in the old habits will have to give way to capable, forward-looking people."¹³ While many of the former provincial first secretaries were promoted, transferred, or retired (as incompetent or superannuated), it seems likely that an appreciable number were removed for having at some time opposed Khrushchev or his faction. In any case, the great majority of the present provincial (as well as regional [*raion*]) first secretaries received their posts during the Khrushchev era, and are doubtless aware of the power that removed their predecessors and brought them to the fore.¹⁴

Quite apart from the difficulty in identifying the organ or faction which is supposed to oppose Khrushchev's authority, there is much positive evidence of his sovereign power. He alone is a member of all the chief organs of dictatorship: (1) the Presidium, (2) the Secretariat, (3) Bureau (for the Russian Republic) of the Central Committee, and (4) the Council of Ministers; no other leader sits on more than two of these bodies. He has the leading posts in the Party, the government, and the army, being First Secretary of the Central Committee, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.¹⁵

¹¹ *World Marxist Review*, June, 1962, p. 7.

¹² The sole exception to this provision is the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., whose members are not limited to three terms. Since the tenure of Secretaries of the Central Committee is not specifically limited either, there is no special obstacle to their serving indefinitely. See footnote 9.

¹³ *World Marxist Review*, June, 1962, "C.P.S.U.—Party of the Entire People," p. 7.

¹⁴ "The principal posts in the Party are filled by people who have come to the fore thanks to a profound knowledge of life and *ability correctly to implement the policies of the Party*. . . ." (*Ibid.*, italics added.)

¹⁵ Stalin did not formally assume this post until wartime.

Khrushchev has personally dominated the two party Congresses that have been held since he achieved supremacy in 1957, especially the Twenty-Second Congress: its first two days were almost entirely devoted to his addresses, and not until the third day did another major leader get to speak. Stenographic reports of the Central Committee plenums show him dominating their proceedings as well. He stands in judgment on the speakers, even criticizing members of the Presidium, interrupts at will, castigating those who displease him (and subsequently sees to it, at least in some instances, that they are duly punished), and generally acts the despot. So far as can be judged from the published reports, the speakers, especially those criticized by Khrushchev, treat him with a deference bordering on subserviency.

A number of important reforms of the Soviet system have been legislated by Khrushchev. He has succeeded in enacting the Party's new program, the first in over 40 years. This formally establishes the pattern and direction of Soviet development for the next two decades, and has been held up as a model for any nation that wishes to realize communism. Khrushchev has engaged extensively in personal diplomacy with the heads of Western governments and with those of the newly emergent nations of Africa. He has spoken for the U.S.S.R. both at the United Nations and at assemblies of the world Communist movement. His lieutenants have credited him with initiative in establishing policies in their own spheres of activity and in the various divisions of statecraft: military strategy,¹⁶ foreign policy, agriculture, housing, industrial administration and Party affairs. Khrushchev has been the source of doctrinal

change in the world Communist movement, modifying the official ideology if not systematically at least in accordance with the needs of practice.

CULT AND RITUAL

The cult of Khrushchev is well established and has made steady progress, his pre-eminence being acknowledged in ritualistic formulas. The current formula, "the Central Committee, headed by N. S. Khrushchev," has advanced him above the position accorded him earlier, when he only "headed" the Presidium. (The superseded formula is now employed only on ceremonial occasions, when an honorary presidium is elected consisting of the "Presidium of the Central Committee, headed by N. S. Khrushchev."¹⁷)

Whole books are published to show Khrushchev the miner, or Khrushchev the corn expert. His military contributions to the winning of The Great Fatherland War are duly recorded in accounts of the partisan movement and of battles at Volgograd (once Stalingrad) and elsewhere. In honorary nominations preceding elections to the Supreme Soviet in 1962, Khrushchev's total was well over twice that of the men who came next, Brezhnev, the formal head of state, and Kozlov.

In speeches and articles all major leaders practice the rites of the Khrushchev cult, if with varying degrees of fervor. They make a point of mentioning his name, though they infrequently mention each other's and he rarely mentions theirs. They praise Khrushchev's fight for peace, knowledge of affairs, closeness to the people, loyalty to Lenin, and theoretical prowess; but if any of *them* have special political qualities, they have had little chance to display them. Compared to Khrushchev, they seem small and obscure, just as Khrushchev did in Stalin's day.

While Khrushchev commands the levers of power and possesses supreme authority, like Stalin in the early 1930's, he is not the autocrat the world came to know by the end of Stalin's reign. As we noted earlier,

¹⁶ For example, Marshal Malinovsky told the Twenty-Second Party Congress that it was on the initiative of Khrushchev that strategic rocket troops had been established. In January, 1960, Khrushchev gave the most comprehensive and authoritative speech on Soviet defense policy in many years, although parts of it were subsequently modified.

¹⁷ There have sometimes been conflicting versions in the press's reporting of this practice.

a consequence of Khrushchev's exercise of personal dictatorship through a single sovereign agency of rule (the party *apparatus*) is that his political will meets resistance and is not fully realized. He himself has alluded to views opposed to his own on particular questions involving Party organization, military affairs, education and diplomacy. In the area of economic policy, there has been considerable discussion and public controversy, especially on questions involving the allocation of resources to chief sectors of the economy: consumer goods industry, agriculture, defense and heavy industry. In public, however, these controversies have usually been waged by persons who are not near the top of the political pyramid and have been conducted on a high level of generality. Yet it is clear that Khrushchev's word is not simply law, for more than once after he had said his word the law turned out otherwise. (This was true, for example, in the educational reform of 1958.)

A WESTERN HYPOTHESIS

Such developments as this have led some Western observers to assume that Khrushchev is the creature of sovereign bodies or groups in the U.S.S.R., even though they have not succeeded in identifying these groups. Khrushchev is allowed to *speak* for these groups, it is supposed, but they *decide* for themselves. Since Khrushchev controls the key political bodies, however, it seems rather that he allows *collective discussion*, in which specialists may also participate, but finally *decides himself* in the light of authoritative opinion and the circumstances prevailing when the decision is finally made.¹⁸ While Khrushchev's political lieutenants write articles and have speeches published, there has not been a

great deal original in them. They for the most part repeat and illustrate what Khrushchev has said, or deal concretely with assigned areas of responsibility; there is little evidence in them of opposition to Khrushchev's major policies. Moreover, while experts have been accorded a much greater voice than previously in the formative stage of policy deliberations, when they have been too critical of Khrushchev's pet proposals, Khrushchev has not hesitated to attack them, and even on occasion to deprive them of their positions.

Actually, the perturbations in Soviet policy arising from opposition to Khrushchev's policies seem no greater than those encountered in the early years of Stalin's dictatorship, or for that matter in Lenin's. Lenin was strongly opposed on many crucial questions in the regime's early years, sometimes even by a majority, but because he was Lenin he always succeeded finally in having his way. Until he was incapacitated by illness, no major measure was taken which did not either originate with Lenin or secure his approval.

Stalin, too, in the early years of his dictatorship, was opposed, and even overruled, by the men whom he had brought to power; but he *had* brought them to power, and they *did* recognize his pre-eminence.¹⁹ Both Lenin and the early Stalin are generally recognized to have been *dictators*, and unless the word has changed its meaning, it should be applied to Khrushchev as well.

LIMITS OF POWER

Khrushchev's rule may be characterized as a *limited dictatorship*. What accounts for the limits on his power? They arise in part from the nature of the Soviet political system. Since there is no formal place in it for a dictator, he must give the appearance of deferring to authoritative bodies in the sphere of his action. Unlike Hitler, for example; Khrushchev must justify his policies formally before the Central Committee and the Party Congress. This formal requirement may have important political consequences if, for example, the arguments

¹⁸ For example, the one-third cut in military personnel which he had adopted in January, 1960, was certainly opposed by important elements in the military establishment; yet it was not until the United States sent military units to Europe, in connection with the Berlin crisis, in mid-1961, that Khrushchev publicly rescinded that decision.

¹⁹ See, for example, the articles written for his fiftieth birthday, December 21, 1929.

he employs are falsified by the next day's events. It is significant that Stalin, after he had succeeded in terrorizing the Soviet leadership, convened only two Party Congresses (and spoke only briefly to the second, in 1952); he called few meetings of the Central Committee; and had only irregular meetings of the Politburo in his last years. It was as if he had to dispense with such formalities in order to make his autocracy truly effective.

A second major source of limits on Khrushchev's power arises from the character of his political and economic reforms. He has tried to provide new incentives for higher productivity throughout the economy, as well as to encourage initiative on the lower echelons. While he has failed to provide the stable political and administrative structure that his scheme seems to require, as long as he continues to aim at enlisting the energies and will of the administrative and professional classes, he will have to take account of their attitudes and desires.

A LACK OF PRESTIGE

Khrushchev's personal dictatorship is also limited by his own past. He lacks the prestige of achievement which made Lenin the universally recognized leader—not by reason of his office or his function, but because he was the founder of both the Party and the State. Khrushchev, moreover, lacks the popular authority which Stalin won as the architect of victory in Russia's war against the Germans. Khrushchev can retain what prestige he has only by avoiding defeats, and he can gain the prestige of a successful dictator only by winning new victories. In lieu of these, he must rely on the cult of Khrushchev and on his control of the levers of power.

TERRIBLE SANCTIONS LACKING

A final source of limits to Khrushchev's

power lies in his incapacity, and perhaps disinclination, to deter opposition by his subordinates by the imminent threat of terrible sanctions. He can reduce their power, or even deprive them of it; but he evidently cannot threaten his lieutenants with imprisonment or the loss of their lives. He has so far been unsuccessful even in his efforts to apply further sanctions against "the anti-party group" as an example to others who might similarly attempt to unseat him.

CONCLUSION

Stalin before him also encountered in his lieutenants a reluctance to imprison, and especially to execute, his defeated rivals. Then, the outcome was the great purge; today, when Soviet society has changed radically and the regime is almost a half-century old, when Khrushchev's associates have been duly warned by History speaking with Khrushchev's own voice, and Khrushchev is approaching his seventieth year, so drastic an outcome is unlikely. Party opinion is strongly opposed to a blood purge and Khrushchev is unlikely to insist on one, for his political character is not Stalin's. The prospects are that Khrushchev's limited dictatorship will continue. Great changes in the Soviet political system or in overall policy, if they are to come at all, await Khrushchev's passing from the political scene.²⁰

Myron Rush studied political science at the University of Chicago, receiving his Ph.D. degree from The Committee on Social Thought in 1951. He analyzed political and economic developments in the Communist world for the United States government until 1955, when he joined The RAND Corporation. His research at RAND on the Soviet Union has dealt with internal politics, military strategy and political use of military power. He has published *The Rise of Khrushchev* (1958) and is the author of several essays on the succession problem in the U.S.S.R.

²⁰ I have discussed this question in two articles: "The Khrushchev Succession Problem," *World Politics*, January, 1962; and "After Khrushchev—What?" *East Europe*, July, 1962.

In an examination of Soviet scientific and technological growth, this specialist points out that the Soviet Union is moving forward rapidly. In their efforts to develop a strong and effective nuclear weapons arsenal, "the Soviets demonstrated their capability to concentrate resources and effort successfully on a critical area, in order to catch up with the Western powers and to attain the strategic and political advantages of being able to deliver high yield nuclear weapons to any point on the globe."

Soviet Competition in Science and Technology

By ROBERT A. KILMARX

United States Department of Defense

THE CURRENT Soviet scientific and technical posture is the result of decades of careful and deliberate planning, based on a materialistic philosophy and consistently supported by top leaders of the state. Stalin's injunction of the early 1930's "to catch up with and to surpass the West" is deeply rooted in national purpose and in Communist faith. Under Khrushchev the difficult task of attaining a level of technological superiority over the West is being pursued with sustained vigor as part of his program of "peaceful coexistence," backed up by increasing military strength. As a result, a base has already been established from which more impressive achievements can be expected during the coming years.

Science and technology are included among the very important indicators of Soviet national strength. Soviet scientific achievements have been marshaled to support the Communist drive for world domination. The example of the Sputniks has clearly demonstrated this fact to the world, although these spectacular accomplishments can mislead as well as inform the layman as to the true state of the Soviet achievement.

At the present moment, the United States

is still generally ahead of the Soviet Union in both science and technology, but not in a number of important areas. On this point there can be no doubt. The U.S.S.R. has been forced to concentrate its effort on those sectors which have been the most important to national defense, and on the building of the heavy industrial base required for further increases in military and economic power. There are still great differences in the quality of scientific research and technology; even and balanced over-all growth has not been attained. Some sectors of industry and some factories within a particular industry are more advanced than others.

In many fields Soviet applied research and experimentation is considerably inferior to the United States. The economic development of Soviet Central Asia and the Soviet Far East has a long way to go. Labor productivity in the U.S.S.R. is still below the United States. In agricultural production, the Soviet record is bleak indeed. The success story of the five and seven year plans is by no means unqualified.

The gap between Soviet and United States progress, however, is closing. The gross national product of the U.S.S.R. is over two-

fifths that of the United States and has been growing at more than twice the United States rate. It appears that our relative economic advantage over the Soviets will continue to diminish, but at a slackening rate. With the passing years, the U.S.S.R. may well equal or even be ahead of the United States in an increasing number of important fields.

There are many reasons for this. A primary one lies in the nature of the Soviet system of organizing, managing and directing its human, material and financial resources, and the effectiveness of the Soviet decision-making process. This permits the U.S.S.R. to bring a larger percentage of its national product to bear upon the scale of global power conflict than the United States. Domestic welfare in the U.S.S.R. has traditionally taken second place to the requirements of military strength, rapid domestic capital formation, and political control. In the United States, consumer satisfaction takes highest precedence.

Another factor is the high level of investment in Soviet scientific research, and the effective and purposeful direction of this effort towards the solution of a growing number of tasks that can result in major benefits to the Communists in the East-West struggle. Another reason is the elevated status of science in the U.S.S.R., and the impetus given to technical education and scientific achievement by the political leaders. In the U.S.S.R., policy makers are technically literate and alert to the potential of applied science.

A third factor is the Soviet capability to benefit from the accomplishments of open Western societies. As a result, the U.S.S.R. can acquire many of the fruits of Western research, development and production and can therefore concentrate on other areas of activity or on making improvements on Western advances. Further progress can also be made in Soviet production by introducing technological equipment and processes already available. In many sectors mechanization in the U.S.S.R. is not well advanced even today and automation is mainly a goal of future planning. In the United States the spread between the actual production state of the art

and the level of available technology is much smaller.

The prospects of greater Soviet progress in many fields compared to estimated United States progress may result from the strict priority system employed in the allocation of resources, the principle of single managerial responsibility adopted and the "multiple hat" system. Under this system, scientists concurrently hold key positions in administration and over-all management, engage in teaching and perhaps serve as military advisors and political consultants. The Soviets have also given a lot of attention to facilitating communication within and, to an increasing extent now, between scientific disciplines. Related to this process is the extensive Soviet program of translating and providing literature on foreign developments to their scientific community. When important scientific problems are to be solved, the Soviets form special task forces under a "head" institute or joint scientific councils which are supported by the best talents and research facilities available.

As a result, a considerable reduction is attained in lead time in solving critical scientific problems and developing new systems. In the selection of projects for development and end items for production, the Soviets have also avoided some of the pitfalls of wasteful competition and duplication of effort.

GROWING SCIENTIFIC CORPS

The significance of these organizational, administrative and operational advantages and capabilities over the years ahead lies in large measure in the increasing number of highly trained scientists and engineers that are being graduated each year in the U.S.S.R. The Soviet output of engineers, for example, has reached a total of about 120,000 to 125,000 engineers a year. The Soviets already have a total of over a million trained engineers, a large proportion of whom received their degrees since 1950 and thus received the benefits of high-quality training. The largest output during the current seven year plan is in fields that can contribute significantly to

further advances in Soviet military, space and priority economic programs, e.g., in chemical technology, automation, computer technology and electronics.

TEACHERS AND DEGREES

In science, as well as engineering, the Soviets are now giving more attention to increasing the number of holders of advanced degrees, which was over 50,000 in science alone out of a total of over 100,000 a few years ago. With an eye to the future, the Soviets are also maintaining a significant lead over the United States in the teaching of science, mathematics and engineering in their elementary and secondary schools. For their increasing pool of scientists, the Soviets are extending their research facilities and even constructing impressive "cities of science" in Central Asia and in the Soviet Far East.

The organization of Soviet research and development, which is under direct governmental supervision, is characterized by centralized planning and direction, and increasingly decentralized management and operation. It has been subject to frequent changes over the years. In spite of a history of unwieldy growth and highly complex administrative channels, the Soviet system in the words of Harrison Brown is "enormously effective and in certain areas almost breathtaking with respect to certain kinds of problems."

Emphasis has long been placed on research and development for the Soviet military forces and related industries, but more attention now is being given to the solution of key problems of economic growth and expanded production. A prime objective is to attain the goals of the seven year plan and the other targets of the more recently announced 20-year draft plan of economic growth. Weapons system research and development, however, will still enjoy top priority and will continue to benefit from effective management and unstinted top level support. In fact, the search for scientific and technological breakthroughs with weapons application is given very high priority.

The Soviets apparently have not been satisfied with the level of efficiency in the use of scientific resources, and with the delays in translating the results of scientific research and technology into production goods. They now intend to apply planning and management techniques that have proven successful in weapons development to vital sectors of the economy. They also seek to make more effective the utilization of scientific facilities and talent, and to improve coordination in scientific research. They are speeding up the introduction of technological advances in industry.

ACADEMY OF SCIENCE

Near the apex of the Soviet research pyramid is the Academy of Science, directly under the Council of Ministers. This famous Academy recently was shorn of some of its laboratories and institutes in order to increase its concentration on theoretical and basic research, and to establish closer links between industries and supporting research establishments. The Academy of Science works closely with state committees, central planning agencies, ministries and councils, as well as universities and other institutes of learning.

During the past few years, technological and production fields of key defense interest have been directed by state committees. Other fields of lesser national importance have been placed under the direction of regional councils and the Union Republic Council of Ministers. Decentralization has been a pronounced trend in over-all Soviet economic organization. In the spring of 1961, a new state committee was established to coordinate advances in the rational utilization of scientific resources in key sectors of national importance and to improve the application of research and development advances to production to attain planned objectives and to expand the research base.

An examination of the state of advance of some of the principal scientific fields contributing to the Soviet space program, along with certain technological aspects, will serve to illustrate the progress that has already been

made in a priority field by this system. The Soviet space program is probably directed by a top level committee of the Council of Ministers, while primary research is left to the Interdepartmental Commission on Interplanetary Communications (I.C.I.C.) of the Academy of Science.

In the basic disciplines of physics and mathematics, Soviet capabilities are at a high level. Particularly outstanding competence has been demonstrated in theoretical physics, high energy nuclear physics, theoretical aspects of solid-state physics and low-temperature physics. In optics and photography, the U.S.S.R. lags behind the United States. In astronomy and geophysics, the Soviets have made remarkable achievements during the past decade, including programs in solar physics, cosmic rays, interstellar and interplanetary matter. In geophysics, extensive research programs are under way in geomagnetism, gravimetry, geodesy and upper atmosphere research, including work on auroras, night-glow, atmospheric dynamics and studies of the ionosphere. The Soviet Union leads the world in the quantity of the work being done in the geophysical sciences.

In the field of physical chemistry, e.g., in chemical kinetics and combustion theory, Soviet research is outstanding and work comparable with that in the West has been accomplished in chemical spectroscopy, electrochemistry, nuclear and radiation chemistry, catalysis and macromolecular chemistry. Except for some high priority areas, however, Soviet research in chemistry is behind that of the United States.

METALLURGY

In metallurgy, the Soviets have made considerable progress in improving metals and developing the necessary alloys, but the United States remains in the lead. Much originality but no major breakthrough has been shown in this field by a growing corps of trained Soviet metallurgists, who considerably outnumber their American counterparts.

In electronics, the Soviets are second only to the United States. There has been con-

siderable progress since 1956 in Soviet research and development in such areas as computers, industrial electronics, automation, solid-state devices, microwave engineering, infra-red sensitive and luminescent materials. Radio-electronics has been given priority attention. Information theory and technical cybernetics have also been given new impetus.

In the biological sciences, Soviet work has been generally inferior but real progress now is being made. Soviet studies of the brain and of the conditions of life in a sustained space environment may be ahead of the United States.

SPACE PROGRAM

A key factor in Soviet successes in space has been the long experience the Soviets have had in missile development, production and testing. This provided them with efficient liquid rocket engine fuels, very large boosters, required structural materials and accurate control and guidance equipment. Results attained have been due to careful and selective application of existing technology to the problems at hand, not to unconventional or exotic solutions. Their space technology today is moving rapidly ahead, in spite of such difficult problems as sustained weightlessness of man in orbit and the need for improved control, guidance, larger boosters, more advanced systems for propulsion, new-type power sources and more sophisticated instrumentation.

The Soviet armed forces—which are directly involved in the Soviet space program—have been the primary beneficiaries of scientific and technological progress. This is especially evident from the growing inventory of Soviet long range missiles to supplement their intercontinental bomber forces, and the advanced Soviet air defense system, which will probably soon be strengthened by anti-missile missiles effective against the IRBM and ICBM. The Soviet missile-equipped naval fleet elements, including nuclear submarines, are another example. Concurrently the Soviets have modernized their land forces, increasing their firepower, armor and maneuverability.

The current capabilities of Soviet military forces are attributable in considerable measure to the progress the U.S.S.R. has made in nuclear weapons. Here the Soviets demonstrated their capability to concentrate resources and effort successfully on a critical area, in order to catch up with the Western powers and to attain the strategic and political advantages of being able to deliver high yield nuclear weapons to any point on the globe.

The Soviet atomic research program had attained a scientific level which was more advanced than is generally known before it was interrupted by the German invasion in World War II. The research structure, the theoretical level, the standards of equipment (including a cyclotron) and the experimental knowledge of the Soviet nuclear program in the late 1930's were generally comparable to those of Western countries at the time. The Russians are believed to be justified in claiming priority for the discovery of spontaneous fission and for original experimental work on the chain reaction and the separation of uranium isotopes. By the end of World War II, however, the West had pulled well into the lead.

WEAPONS PARITY?

Through priority postwar efforts, often obstructed at first by inferior technology, war-time losses, political and security problems, the Soviets reportedly have been able to attain nuclear weapons parity with the West in many important weapons categories. Soviet science and technology have provided a broad and extensive family of nuclear weapons to the armed forces, particularly high-yield thermonuclear weapons for the long-range bomber and missile forces. The explosion of a Soviet thermonuclear bomb almost a decade ago, approximately three years before the date predicted in United States estimates, provided convincing testimony that our lead in this field was growing smaller. Through accelerated work in the nuclear weapons field during the nuclear test moratorium, Soviet leaders were able by 1961 to find considerable

satisfaction in the development of higher yield weapons of decreasing weight and greater efficiency, with lesser amounts of fissionable material.

The modernity of the over-all Soviet nuclear program was revealed to be at an impressively high level at the International Conferences on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy held in Geneva in 1955, and again in 1958. Today it can be stated that the Soviets have active programs in most nuclear fields, including weapons production, diverse reactor development, construction of advanced accelerators and other research equipment and facilities, an important controlled thermonuclear power program, nuclear propulsion, isotope separation and the application of isotopes to industrial and medical processes.

CONCLUSION

The challenge posed by these and other Soviet advances in science and technology is extending more and more into the field of international politics. The Soviets are exploiting their capabilities in the cold war, to foster the image that their Communist society is riding the wave of the future, is more powerful than the West and furnishes the better formula to underdeveloped states striving for economic development and prestige. Although the image and the techniques of exploitation can be countered, the realities of increasing Soviet scientific and technological strength cannot be gainsaid. The trend represents one of the most serious and growing threats to the security in freedom of the Western world.

Robert A. Kilmarx has written many articles on the Soviet military, and is the author of *A History of Soviet Air Power* (published earlier this year). During World War II he served with the United States Army Air Corps in Europe. He also served as an aide to the Deputy United States Military Governor for Germany. He is a senior civilian employee in the Department of Defense.

Have the conditions of Soviet labor improved? This specialist declares that Russian workers "are probably considerably better off than at any time as far back as their memory can take them and further improvements have been promised."

The Status of the Soviet Worker

By MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY

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REITERATING a dictum of Lenin which sums up one of communism's cardinal beliefs, Khrushchev told a conference of railwaymen in May, 1962, "Victory [of communism over capitalism] is possible only on the basis of higher labor productivity." The notion of the equality of earnings was never accepted in the U.S.S.R. Soviet wages, which are decreed by a central authority, have invariably been of the incentive type, according to the principle written into the Soviet constitution of 1936: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work." The application of the principle of communism: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need" has been relegated to a distant and nebulous future.

Discussing the new program of the Communist Party at the 22nd congress of the Party in October, 1961, Khrushchev stated that "it is the Party's assumption that for the next twenty years payment according to work remains the chief means of satisfying material and cultural needs"; it is "a potent method of increasing output." Khrushchev added that

while doing our utmost to promote and reinforce moral incentives to labor, we must employ the principle of distribution according to work consistently and to the fullest degree, as a key factor in the building of communist society.

The Soviet leader asserted, by way of explanation, that

we shall move on from the socialist principle of distribution according to work to the communist principle of distribution according to need. In addition to an abundance of material and cultural benefits, this will call for another, no less important precondition—the transformation of labor into a primary necessity for everyone. Until this precondition has been realized, attempts to "introduce" communist distribution would mean the spreading of the leveling [in earnings], which undermines production. The Party is resolutely opposed to a "line" of this sort.

The precondition—"transformation of labor into a primary necessity of life for everyone"—means a basic change in the attitude towards work and amounts to a fundamental change in human behavior. Twenty years is surely not too long a period to achieve this object—if it can be achieved at all. Khrushchev conceded in his May speech that a comparison of the records of the Soviet and the United States railways indicates that while "our railwaymen work better, evidently labor productivity is still higher in the United States than in our country."

What is the present state of Soviet labor? What has been done in recent years to divert the balance of productivity, to which communism attaches such importance, in favor of the Soviet Union, and what results have been achieved?

The Soviet labor force is large and rapidly growing. In 1961, 66 million workers and employees were engaged in the national economy, an increase of nearly 4 million over

1960. These figures do not include collective farmers. There was no unemployment. The educational standards of labor have vastly improved. Illiteracy has practically disappeared and the educational qualifications of workers have risen. In all schools, particularly in the secondary and the higher schools, the emphasis is on the teaching of the sciences. It takes time to build up a sizeable body of highly trained skilled workers and technicians. Recent Soviet achievements in the various fields of technical endeavor indicate that the situation in this respect is not unsatisfactory and is likely to continue to improve.

THE TURNING POINT

It is not open to doubt that the death of Stalin was an important turning point in the history of the Soviet Union even though Communist ideology, the international and national objectives of Moscow, and many of the Stalinist methods were retained unaltered. It may be symbolic that two days before the removal of Stalin's embalmed body from the Lenin Mausoleum in Red Square a memorial to Karl Marx was inaugurated in the Sverdlovsk Square in Moscow.

The year 1956 was of particular significance in the annals of Soviet labor and, indeed, in those of the Soviet community as a whole. It will be recalled that the rapid growth of industry which followed the introduction of planning in 1928 resulted in a sharp increase in the demand for labor and the (unplanned) disappearance of unemployment. This situation, combined with pronounced wage differentials among industries and the acute shortage and the uneven distribution of consumer goods, including foodstuffs, led to what was known as "the fluidity" of labor, that is, the incessant shifting of workers from industry to industry and from enterprise to enterprise.

The resulting instability of employment was incompatible with high labor productivity. After trying a variety of measures to check the movement of workers, the Stalin government prohibited them from releasing

their jobs without formal permission of the director of the enterprise. The director had the authority to grant the dispensation only under limited conditions provided by law (decree of June 26, 1940). An unauthorized abandonment of work became an actionable offense punishable by "corrective labor." The immobilization of workers, which it is sometimes claimed (it would seem without good reason) was a measure of war preparedness for the impending war with Hitler's Germany, remained in force for 11 years after the end of World War II. It was repealed by a law of April 25, 1956, which terminated the attachment to jobs. Even if the 1940 law was not rigidly enforced, as seems likely, its abrogation removed a major disability of Soviet workers and restored them to the status of free men.

Other measures which liberalized Soviet social and economic policies and benefited labor should be noted. A law of June 10, 1956, abolished the tuition fees in the upper grades of the secondary and in the higher schools, imposed in October, 1940. Thus, secondary and higher education ceased to be the privilege of those who could afford to pay the rather high fees. The status of labor was enhanced by a regulation enacted in 1959 that only young people having a record of at least two years of practical work in industry or farming should be admitted as full time students by the higher schools providing instruction in law, literature, journalism, philosophy and economics.

A law of June 14, 1956, extended the coverage of old age and disability pensions and increased the amount of allocations under this heading; the monthly old age pensions provided by the law vary from 300 rubles to 1,200 rubles. The application of this law, according to official reports, resulted in the substantial increase of some 15 million pensions, and the granting of one million new pensions. By a law of September 8, 1956, the level of monthly wages exempt from income tax was raised from 260 to 370 rubles and the surtax on single persons was discontinued. Group subscription to state loans

which was voluntary in theory but obligatory in practice was terminated in 1957. Simultaneously, however, the service and redemption of state loans amounting to 260 billion rubles were discontinued.

WAGE SYSTEM

Questions of particular interest to labor are wages, working hours, paid vacations, and housing. Until the middle of the 1950's Soviet wages, both monetary and real, were exceedingly low. Real wages were somewhat raised after the currency reform of 1948 when commodity prices were reduced while the level of monetary wages remained unchanged.

A salient feature of the Soviet wage system was, until recently, drastic wage differentiation. Workers employed in branches of the national economy regarded as particularly important to the fulfillment of the plan received a higher rate of pay than workers in other categories. A law of September, 1956, raised the minimum wage in industry, construction, transport, and communications to 300 rubles per month for city workers and to 270 rubles for those residing in rural areas. This measure tended to reduce the gap between the low and the high rates of pay. In 1957, 8 billion rubles were appropriated to increase the wages of all workers by an average of 33 per cent. The Twenty-First Party Congress (January–February, 1959) ordered a further increase of the minimum wage to 400–500 rubles per month in 1959–1962, and to 500–600 in 1963–1965.

Higher wages were accompanied by the shortening of the working day. Legislation providing for a 7-hour day and a 42-hour week was enacted in 1927 but the 8-hour day was reintroduced by a decree of June 26, 1940. A return to the 7-hour day was ordered by the Twentieth Party Congress (February, 1956) while the 6-hour day was to be made effective in underground and other strenuous occupations. This program has been carried out. Further reductions of working hours were provided by the Twenty-First Party Congress (February, 1959) which approved the Seven Year Plan (1959–1965) and by the new program of the Communist Party

adopted by the Twenty-Second Congress (October, 1961). According to the program, in the coming 10 years the country will change to the 6-hour working day with one day off a week or a 35-hour working week with 2 days off, and in underground work and hazardous occupations to a 4-hour working day or a 30-hour, 5-day working week.

Since 1957 all workers are entitled to a two-week paid vacation. The new party program extends the length of the paid vacation to three weeks and "then to one month." The effective date of these changes is not stated.

Housing is by far the weakest spot in the Soviet social and economic program. While important housing developments are being hastily built, a real improvement of the situation still lies in the future.

The above enumeration of the measures enacted by the Soviet government to improve the conditions of labor suggests an important shift in the policies of the Kremlin. It is more difficult, however, to assess with any degree of precision to what extent the living standards of the working class were actually raised. Repeated changes in the value of the ruble, its uncertain purchasing power, and the absence of an index of prices and real wages make generalizations concerning the trend of real wages hazardous. Many attempts have been made to compare Soviet standards with those of other countries. International comparisons of this order are, even under the most favorable conditions, full of pitfalls.

THE WORKERS' STATUS

It is reasonably clear, nevertheless, that Soviet workers are less well off than their opposite numbers in the United States and the advanced Western European countries. Shortage of housing with its concomitants—overcrowding and lack of privacy—inevitably creates social and emotional strain. Practically no Soviet worker owns a car and many of the domestic appliances which are taken as a matter of course in the United States, England, or Western Germany are beyond the reach of Russian labor. Soviet official pronouncements and the press are full of criticism of the quality of consumer goods.

It would be easy, however, to exaggerate the consequences of these shortcomings. Russian workers, it is safe to assume, view their conditions not from the standpoint of workers in the advanced Western countries about which they know little, but from that of their own experience in the not too distant past. They are probably considerably better off than at any time as far back as their memory can take them and further improvements have been promised. The current shortage of articles of general consumption is the result of the emphasis on the production of producer goods. According to an official report on the fulfillment of the plan for 1961 production of the means of production had increased by 10 per cent over 1960 and that of consumers items, by 6.6 per cent. This, of course, is no accident but the continuation of a policy followed by the Soviet planned economy since its inception.

If comparisons between labor conditions in Russia and in the West are unrewarding, this observation applies fully to any attempt to draw a parallel between Soviet standards and those of the less developed countries, many of them former colonies, which differ greatly among themselves in their historical and cultural background and economic levels. It may be well to keep in mind, however, that while the newly formed national states in Asia, Africa, and the Pacific are, as a rule, in the initial stages of industrialization, Russia has an industrial tradition that can be traced back to the early eighteenth century. To put it differently, the problems confronting Ghana or Indonesia are of an entirely different order from those a youthful Soviet Union had to face in 1917.

The recent tendency among historians and economists to emphasize economic growth as the determining factor in economic development, and to reduce economic history to a few index numbers has been instrumental in blurring the Soviet picture and in grossly exaggerating Soviet achievements. The rate of growth is an elusive concept, legitimate for certain narrow purposes, but only too often

wrongly used as the sole or chief criterion in measuring economic progress.

Professor Raymond J. Saulnier, formerly Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers and an exceptionally keen and well-qualified observer, recently visited the Soviet Union and was struck by the poor standard of new construction, the low quality of the goods in the shops, and their high prices. Saulnier sums up his impressions by stating that "one familiar with statistics on Soviet economic growth will be astonished to see so little evidence of the growth that these statistics proclaim."¹ This remark should be kept in mind while considering the evidence of improvement in the conditions of Soviet labor presented in this article.

The Twenty-Second Congress (1961) approved the new party program, the first and long-delayed revision since the appearance of the original program in 1919. The new program outlines in some detail the social and economic objectives which the Communist party expects to attain within the next decade or two. The primary "task of historic importance" is "to ensure a living standard in the Soviet Union higher than that of any capitalist country." The national income of the U.S.S.R. is to increase by "almost 150 per cent" in the next 10 years and by "about 400 per cent" in 20 years.

In the first ten years the real incomes of all workers and employees . . . will be on the average almost double, while the incomes of the workers and employees in the low-paid categories will approximately triple. Thus by the end of the first decade there will be no low-paid groups of workers and employees in the country.

As the income of the population rises, the pattern of consumption will be changed basically.

The entire population will be able to satisfy amply its demand for high-quality and varied food products. . . . The demand . . . for high-quality consumer goods—well-made and attractive clothing, footwear and goods for improving and adorning the daily life of Soviet people, such as comfortable modern furniture, improved household articles, a wide range of goods for cultural purposes, and so on—will be amply satisfied. Production of automobiles for the public will be considerably expanded.

¹ *Fortune*, May, 1962.

Radical changes are promised in housing.

The housing shortage will be ended in the course of the first decade. Those families that still live in overcrowded and poor houses will receive new apartments. By the conclusion of the second decade every family, including newlyweds, will have a well-appointed apartment meeting the requirements of health and cultured living.

There will be a comprehensive health service which will provide free medical care, hospitalization, and medications free of charge.

In order to afford the people the opportunity for recreation in an out-of-door environment, rest homes, boarding houses, country hotels and tourist camps will be built where working people will be accommodated at reasonable charges . . . or free.

Women, especially mothers, will be relieved of most of the domestic chores. "Public catering will take a preponderant place over home cooking within ten or fifteen years."

Such is the alluring picture unfolded by the party program. Khrushchev, whose inspiration is unmistakable in this curious document, exclaimed at the Twenty-Second Congress:

Socialism is not just a system. Of all the values created by the socialist system, the greatest is the new man, the active builder of communism. The Soviet people are providing more and more proof of what a truly free man of the new world is capable of.

CONCLUSION

Do the Soviet workers share the enthusiasm of The Leader and do they believe in the promises of the program the implementation of which is to be conditioned by their higher productivity? The program itself is a heavy-footed clumsy compilation which few have probably read. Its more striking provisions, such as the promises of social betterment quoted above, have been widely disseminated through the medium of the radio and the newspapers. Yet the program, its cumbersome phraseology and unbending doctrinaire approach notwithstanding, is a remarkable *profession de foi* and deserves close scrutiny.

Seemingly for the first time, communism claims infallibility in questions of dogma.

"The Communist Party," says the program, "which . . . possesses knowledge of the laws of social development—ensures correct leadership in all work of communist construction, giving it an organized, planned, and scientific character." The program states a few paragraphs later that "the cult of the individual and related violations of collective leadership, inner-party democracy, and socialist legality are incompatible with the Leninist principles of party life." It is difficult to see how these two assertions can be reconciled. If the knowledge of social development claimed by the Party ensures correct leadership, and if the cult of the individual is incompatible with Leninist principles, how did it happen that the worshipful adulation of Stalin was maintained for nearly 30 years with the seemingly unanimous and enthusiastic support of Soviet leaders, including Khrushchev himself?

How far have things actually changed since 1953? The cult of the individual is officially outlawed but there is no instance on record of anyone even implying that Nikita Sergeevich might be wrong. The Soviet record does not support the claim to the infallibility of Communist leadership. If doubts such as those expressed here should ever occur to Soviet workers, they may well feel inclined to take a less sanguine view of the millenium promised by the party program than the invariably unanimous votes and stormy applause of party congresses would indicate.

Michael T. Florinsky is the author of many books, including *Towards an Understanding of the U.S.S.R.* (1951); a two-volume study of *Russia: A History and an Interpretation* (1953); and *Integrated Europe?* (1955). Former editor of *Commercial and Tariff History*, 1939–1941, he is a member of the American Economic Association and the Economic History Association. From 1921 to 1932, Mr. Florinsky served as associate editor of the *Economic and Social History of the World War*, a publication of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Discussing United States-Soviet rivalry in Europe, this author observes that there are two alternatives to the "fundamental impasse" over German unification: "a settlement based upon the recognition that, at least for the foreseeable future, the division of Germany is a fact of life that the West must learn to live with; or no settlement at all and an indefinite continuation of the precarious status quo. . . ."

Coexistence in West Europe

By MORTON BERKOWITZ

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RECENT YEARS have produced a number of dramatic changes in the image the Soviet Bloc and its foreign policy have presented to the West. Immense forces of change released by the death of Stalin have upset many of our preconceived assumptions and projections about future developments in the Communist world. The emergence of great cracks in the previously monolithic Communist wall of command and authority, the appearance of a dynamic, flexible, and politically oriented policy of aid and trade with the developing nations, the growth of Soviet competition with the advanced industrial nations in the export of surpluses, and the tremendously significant process of the economic integration of the Communist Bloc are important to this rapidly changing picture.

While the picture of emerging international relations, then, is a varied one, and not subject to simplistic analysis, one may locate the nerve center of today's international conflict in the area of Russian-American rivalry. These two countries, together, control nearly two-thirds of the world's goods and services and most of its military power. This rivalry has taken many forms in past years. However, at present the center of the conflict is in Europe. Everywhere else the conflict is mediated and blunted by the use of inter-

mediaries and the complex problems of political and economic development of the underdeveloped world, but in Europe the conflict is naked, for the two systems stand there toe-to-toe. And nowhere is this more true than in Berlin.

THE BERLIN IMPASSE

The pre-eminence of Berlin among the many trouble spots of the cold war and its central place in the strategy of both East and West have been underscored. Almost daily pronouncements are thundered across the Iron Curtain from the East that Berlin is "a bone in our throats" and "a cancer." From the West come warnings that "our rights in Berlin are not negotiable," and that "no one is going to push us out of Berlin." Walter Lippmann has testified, in his account of the now famous interview with Khrushchev, that it was his strong impression that a solution to the Berlin crisis in particular and the problem of Germany in general has top priority on the Soviet agenda.

President Kennedy has implied a similar evaluation of the importance of Berlin on many occasions. Berlin is central to the Russian-American conflict because at stake is not only Berlin but also the future of a divided Germany. Both East and West Germany have been so far integrated, polit-

ically and economically, into their respective spheres, that detaching them possibly would create more problems than it would solve. German division is a fact of life. The only weak point in the dividing line is Berlin.

The tangled situation in Berlin is based upon decisions hastily conceived and just as hastily taken immediately after World War II. The definition of occupation zones and the creation of an isolated West Berlin enclave within the Soviet Zone were based upon optimistic assumptions about the continued cooperation between East and West. The chronology of blasted hopes and frustrated expectations of this early postwar period is only too familiar. It is sufficient to point out that in the light of later developments, the assumption of a smooth, untroubled road leading to the reunification of Germany, with a united Berlin as its capital, proved to be a serious error. Berlin instead became the focus of what both sides agreed was an "abnormal" situation, productive of continuing crises and tension.

Berlin also became a symbol, and like all symbols, attached to it were values, hopes and fears that were only tenuously connected with any political reality. (The heroism and courage displayed during the 1948 blockade contributed greatly to this process.) Trouble in Berlin, then, has a long history. It began with the attempt of the Allies to take over power in accordance with the Four Power Agreements. It flared up in an open contest during the Berlin blockade, and it continued smoldering for the balance of the Stalin era.

The opening shot in the current Berlin crisis was Khrushchev's six-month ultimatum of November 27, 1958, containing the threat to sign a separate peace treaty with the East Germans, and implying that subsequent to this the West's rights in West Berlin could be maintained only by negotiation with East Germany. At the height of the crisis, however, Khrushchev characteristically postponed the deadline date, and the tension subsided. A period of comparative quiet, which has been

accurately and humorously labeled by Alexander Werth as the period of "Waiting for Kennedy," followed. Like the characters of Samuel Beckett's play, the Soviets were also destined to wait for a Kennedy who never appeared.

If Khrushchev had expected a new administration more pliable, understanding and amenable to Soviet aims in Berlin than the previous Eisenhower administration, this illusion was effectively shattered by the President's reaction to the Vienna Meeting of 1961. It was made clear to Kennedy at these "somber" talks that the Soviet position in Berlin had not softened since the demands of 1958. These demands had called for a free, demilitarized city of West Berlin, and a speedy peace treaty with a united, neutral Germany, or individual peace treaties with both parts of a divided Germany (implying, of course, the recognition of East Germany).

President Kennedy's reaction was swift and vigorous. In an immediate counterattack, on July 25, he reaffirmed the Administration's determination not to be driven out of Berlin, invoked the nuclear deterrent, and asked Congress for an immediate addition to the defense budget of almost \$3.5 million, plus substantial increases in the manpower of the armed forces. The heightened tension and the expectation of imminent tragedy resulted in an unprecedented outpouring of refugees fleeing from East to West Berlin across the still open dividing line. It was estimated that "in the first twelve days of August, alone, some twenty-two thousand refugees reached West Berlin."¹

Smarting under this humiliation and, more important, fearing the drain on manpower to an East German economy whose resources already were being strained by the demands of economic integration in Eastern Europe, the Ulbricht regime acted quickly. A brick wall was erected to seal off escape to West Berlin. Soviet and American tanks eyed each other ominously across the Berlin wall. Again, having gone to the brink, Khrushchev drew back. Conciliatory statements followed, the tanks retreated to less militant positions in the rear, and tension subsided.

¹ Anthon, Carl G., "The Berlin Crisis and Atlantic Unity," *Current History*, January, 1962, p. 23.

The irony of all this, as Frederick W. Neal has pointed out, is that "it is by no means clear that anyone is threatening to push us out of Berlin."² The Soviets have made many proposals, but only by severely stretching the imagination can these proposals be construed as a serious attempt to evict the West by force from Berlin. They have set various deadlines (each time postponed when the danger level became too high) for the signing of a peace treaty with East Germany. This might conceivably lead to a situation in which the East Germans would try to force us out (if we refused to deal with them). But accompanying all these threats have been so many proposals and plans by which the West could remain in Berlin, that this must go on record as one of the most ambiguous and highly-qualified threats in the history of diplomacy.

What is obvious from all the Soviet proposals is that the basic issue is not Berlin alone, but the final solution of the problem of two Germanies. All Soviet proposals lead to one irresistible conclusion—the institutionalization and legalization of the current division of Germany and a consequent recognition of the East German regime.

THE DISARMAMENT DEADLOCK

Berlin would not be such a focal point of hopes and fears if it were not for another central fact of our time—the arms race. It is in Berlin alone, of all the trouble spots of the world, that Russian and American forces face each other directly, without the possibility of hiding behind intermediaries (as in Laos, for instance). It is therefore in Berlin, (and in Europe in general), where the room to maneuver is so small, that the fears generated by an uncontrolled arms race are centered.

The history of disarmament negotiations is one of near misses, lost opportunities, and propagandistic exploitation. In June, 1946, the United States proposed the Baruch Plan. It proposed international ownership and management of atomic materials and

facilities, and offered to give up its stockpile of atomic weapons after an intensive system of inspection and control prevented any nation from building nuclear weapons. The U.S.S.R. presented its own scheme on June 19, 1946, calling for the immediate prohibition and destruction of atomic bombs, to be followed by discussion of an international control plan.

Resulting discussion in the United Nations Commission of both plans arrived at a stalemate, the pattern of which was clear. The Soviet Union was unwilling to relinquish the possibility of developing its own nuclear weapons and to open its territory to Western inspectors unless the United States first destroyed its stockpiles. The United States, for its part, was unwilling to destroy its stockpiles and jeopardize its military advantage unless inspection guaranteed that the Soviets could not secretly develop atomic weapons. In addition, the Soviets viewed the American proposal for internationalization under the auspices of the United Nations, which was then characterized by an almost automatic American majority in all organs, with undisguised suspicion.

The pattern of United States insistence on control first and disarmament later and Soviet insistence on the reverse was also clearly revealed. Underlying the failure of negotiations was the fundamental proposition that no disarmament plan which freezes an existing imbalance of military power between the contending parties has any chance of success. Only a state of comparative military parity provides a fruitful atmosphere for such negotiations.

While the American monopoly of atomic power was broken dramatically by the Soviet explosion of a nuclear device in September, 1949, no important changes in the substance of the existing disarmament stalemate occurred until 1955. On May 10 of that year, the Soviet Union put forth what many Western observers considered the first serious Soviet disarmament plan with a real chance of being accepted, or at least negotiated, by the West. It came very close to accepting many of the

² Neal, Frederick W., *War & Peace & Germany*, W. W. Norton: New York, 1962, p. 14.

previous Western proposals. It accepted the principles of inspection on a permanent basis, with "international access at any time to all objects of control," and proposed that inspectors be stationed at fixed ground posts strategically located for the purpose of the detection of preparations necessary for sudden attack.

The Soviet plan contained many proposals unacceptable to the West and left many crucial problems unsolved, but it was, as William Frye pointed out, "a striking contrast to anything the Soviet Government under Stalin had been prepared to say."³ And it left East and West with so much apparent agreement, in principle, that to many a comprehensive disarmament plan seemed imminent. The response, however, to this sudden narrowing of the gap between East-West proposals was an immediate announcement that the West was no longer committed to its previously announced positions. The chance of agreement soon passed and the world was no closer to the dream of disarmament than it had been when the first mushroom blossomed over the New Mexico desert.

Throughout the months and years of prolonged and often sterile negotiations leading to the deadlock of mid-1962 at the Geneva Conference, certain key issues persisted. Insight into the disarmament stalemate can more profitably be gained by focusing attention on these issues instead of tracing out, chronologically, the pattern of negotiations.⁴ An analysis of these underlying areas of disagreement can be narrowed down to the following basic points: 1) Western emphasis on inspection before disarmament versus Soviet emphasis on the reverse; 2) Western emphasis on slowly-phased stages of disarmament, with control at every stage, and Soviet

insistence on the achievement of complete disarmament during the first stage;⁵ 3) Western emphasis on the solution of highly technical problems leading to a one-hundred-percent-foolproof detection system versus Soviet emphasis on the solution of political questions firmly tied to disarmament. While these are some of the more specific areas of disagreement, one might say that the basic underlying difficulty is the general mistrust, suspicion and scepticism, fed by historical memories, with which each side views the other.

END OF BALKANIZATION

The economic burdens of an uncontrolled arms race are heightened and intensified by the growing demands on economic resources. These demands have resulted from two of the most significant developments in recent years: the economic integration of Europe (both East and West) and the emergence of two giant economic units, C.E.M.A. and the Common Market. Ironically these developments promise to put an end to that age old process—the Balkanization of Europe. In doing so, they are at the same time creating new problems for both East and West.

While the story of the Common Market is a familiar one, the emergence of its counterpart in the East has gone comparatively unnoticed. Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe can be divided into three historical periods. The period from 1949 to 1953 was primarily a period of plunder and exploitation, shaped in great part by the necessity of rebuilding the Soviet economy which had been shattered by World War II. It was during this period that C.E.M.A. was established, in 1949, by the U.S.S.R. and its East European satellites in response to the action of the West in establishing Nato and O.E.E.C. The announced object was to secure "a broad economic cooperation" among members of the bloc.

The second period, instituted by the death of Stalin in 1953 and lasting until the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, was a transition period characterized by the desperate search for new formulae to meet the already growing signs of instability and unrest in re-

³ Frye, William R., "Characteristics of Recent Arms Control Proposals & Agreements," in Brennan, Donald G., *Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security*, Braziller: New York, 1961, p. 75.

⁴ For an excellent chronological survey, see Frye, William R., *ibid.*

⁵ It should be mentioned, however, that the popular conception, that the Soviets reject any imposition of controls during this first stage, is incorrect. The disagreement is one on the scope and timing of controls.

lations between the Soviet Union and its empire. The Twentieth Party Congress, with its great emphasis on the need for more rational economic cooperation and integration within the bloc, heralded the beginning of a new era in intra-bloc relations to be erected on radically different principles than those operative during the Stalin period.

C.E.M.A., during the first period, operated basically as an instrument by which to cover the underlying process of exploitation through joint companies and other such mechanisms with a mask of mutual cooperation. During the second period it was comparatively inactive. It emerged after 1956 as the institution where "the new Soviet attitude was crystallized into a clear, practicable policy, in which economic rationality and mutual interest were combined in a program to achieve the eventual economic integration of Eastern Europe."⁶

The general goals of the new policy to be complemented by C.E.M.A. can best be summarized as an attempt to turn Eastern Europe into a viable, interdependent economy, able to compete with the West and the Common Market. This was to be accomplished through an ambitious plan for the specialization of production based on a rational international division of labor. C.E.M.A. was to act as an international planning authority to link and adjust the various national economic plans, and to devise an over-all plan for the development of resources within the bloc. The elimination of the least efficient producers in the bloc through such plans, it was expected, would result in greater bloc efficiency, and therefore less dependence on Soviet economic assistance.

In its annual World Economic Survey, the United Nations reports that

the coordination of national plans of economic development under the aegis of C.E.M.A. has

been tending to play an increasing part in the shaping of investment plans and policies in member countries. The attempt has been one to allocate investment in individual countries in conformity with the need of other centrally planned economies.⁷

In many instances joint projects have been set up for the development of national resources by various countries. Thus, Czechoslovakia has participated financially in the development of Polish sulphur deposits, East Germany has taken part in the development of Polish coal mines, and Hungary and Rumania have jointly financed the construction of a gas pipeline providing Rumanian natural gas to Hungary.

The largest among such projects is the construction of pipelines for the delivery of Soviet crude oil from the Vega region to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany. *The New York Times* reports, on January 1, 1961, the completion of the first link in this network of pipelines. The same *Times* dispatch reports the setting up of a body which will administer an integrated electric power system intended to unite the power-generating capacity of the Soviet Union and East European countries, and the adoption of a set of principles to govern the international division of labor among Communist-ruled countries.

The net result has been the emergence of an integrated, interdependent economic bloc similar to the Common Market, but going much further in the area of international planning. It is designed to give the satellites a vested interest in remaining within the bloc, and to substitute such an interest for the coercion of the Stalin period. At the same time, it has materially contributed to the dispersion of authority in the Communist camp, and to the growing necessity for the Soviet Union to lead its bloc within the confines of a Communist consensus similar to that operating in the West. One scholar has pointed out, for instance, that "the effective right of members to oppose C.E.M.A. recommendations lends it a procedural frame of reference that differs sharply from other Soviet models of administrative organization."⁸

⁶ Jaster, Robert, "CEMA's Influence on Soviet Policies in East Europe," *World Politics*, April, 1962, p. 508.

⁷ United Nations, *World Economic Survey 1959*, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York, 1960, pp. 109-110.

⁸ Jaster, Robert, *ibid.*, p. 517.

ECONOMIC FACTORS

The significance of these developments and their effects on the future pattern of Russian-American rivalry cannot be overestimated. The process has already begun to shift the focus of Russian-American rivalry from the military to the economic sphere. The history of the Soviet economy, so far, has been one of a greatly expanding domestic production, with internal demand fully keeping pace. Thus there has been little surplus production for disposal abroad. This situation already is showing signs of change, and will be accelerated by the development plans of C.E.M.A.

The capacity for primary production is becoming so large that surpluses already surpass internal needs in some areas, and will continue to do so in others during the next decade. The much-publicized Soviet oil offensive is a prime example of this development. The agreements negotiated with Matteio, of Italy, for the purchase of Soviet crude oil at prices substantially below those of its competitors is already undercutting traditional sources of supply. In a study released by the Senate Internal Security Committee on June 25, 1962, the rising volume of cheap Soviet oil was called "a grave threat to the Free World." The Druzhba Pipeline, by sharply reducing the cost of moving Soviet oil westward, should make it even easier for Soviet petroleum salesmen to quote low prices in Europe.

The pattern of such competition in the future probably will become one of bloc-wide competition with the West, rather than being focused in the Soviet Union alone. Together with parallel developments in the West, we have the emergence of competition between two giant economic blocs—the Common Market and C.E.M.A. The growing frequency of recent attacks on the Common Market by Khrushchev indicates a possible

replacement of Nato with the Market as the chief object of Soviet attack. This would be in line with the developments named above, and with a growing awareness on the part of the Soviets that in the near future this will be the decisive area of conflict.⁹ That this is also appreciated by President Kennedy is revealed in his 1962 Independence Day speech, which seems to look forward to a stronger economic association of the United States with the Common Market.

It would seem, then, that this is the substantive meaning of competitive coexistence, from the Soviet point of view. As such, it has implications for the Western assessment of Soviet intentions in current areas of rivalry, such as Berlin and disarmament. For the kind of process envisaged by these developments is a long-term one. To secure a long and uninterrupted period of peace for the development of these economic forces would be logically a paramount objective of Soviet policy. Thus, the credibility of Soviet desires for some type of *modus vivendi* based on the status quo becomes much greater.

It might be pointed out, however, that there is a distinction, from Khrushchev's point of view, between the formal territorial status quo and the underlying international distribution of power. It is the formal status quo that Khrushchev would like to see institutionalized. Within the freezing of existing territorial arrangements the distribution of power would continue to shift in favor of the Communist camp. In Khrushchev's view, the growing economic abundance and power of an integrated Communist world would be in contrast to a West plagued by the economic rivalries inherent in capitalism, and by the aggravating economic problems generated by disarmament and automation. The Soviets obviously hope that the result would be a continuing centripetal attraction to the Communist Bloc for the developing nations. One need not accept Khrushchev's pessimistic view of the chances of capitalism in this struggle to visualize the Soviet image of the future pattern of conflict between East and West.

The implications that this has for a settlement of the Berlin crisis and the possibilities

⁹ The increasingly important role to be played by C.E.M.A. was underscored, on July 19, 1962, by the Soviet announcement of the appointment of V. N. Novikov, a Deputy Premier, as its representative on the Council. All other member nations were expected to release Deputy Premiers for similar duty.

of disarmament are clear. East Germany, as we have seen, is an important part of the plan to integrate, economically, the Communist world, and as such, it has become non-detachable. An acceptance of this reality could make the negotiation of a stable accord on the status of West Berlin much easier.

It might be argued that the United States, by virtue of its position as leader of the Western Alliance, cannot officially give up the idea of liberating East Germany. But there are clear indications that Germany already has given up this idea. John Scott, in a report to the publisher of *Time*, writes: "I found a striking number of West German business leaders who have adjusted their minds to the permanent division of Germany and who are looking for formulae to stabilize relations with the G.D.R. without giving away West Berlin."¹⁰ Economically, this is underlined by the fact that from 1955 to 1960 West Germany's trade with the G.D.R. increased by 94 per cent, while in the same period West Germany's total trade increased by only 54 per cent.¹¹ In fact, the Adenauer government has been subjected to considerable pressure from within West Germany to end the contradiction between the growing stabilization of economic ties between the two regimes, and the complete absence of political ties.

The only other route to a durable settlement is, of course, the one leading to reunification. The economic obstacles to such a step have already been pointed out. But politically, also, there are perhaps insurmountable obstacles. The basis of the entire Western policy in Europe has been organized around Nato, with West Germany supplying a major portion of its sinew and muscle. Any reunification of Germany which would lead to its withdrawal from Nato is completely unacceptable to the West. But this is precisely the only condition which would make it ac-

ceptable to the East. Soviet discussions about the unification of Germany have, without exception, considered this alternative only as a part of a general plan leading to the neutralization of Germany, and possibly the creation of a larger demilitarized zone in Central Europe. Such plans for disengagement have been consistently rejected by the United States. This fundamental impasse seems to make any settlement based on the unification of Germany only the remotest of possibilities.

The alternatives narrow down basically to these two possibilities: a settlement based upon the recognition that, at least for the foreseeable future, the division of Germany is a fact of life that the West must learn to live with; or no settlement at all and an indefinite continuation of the precarious status quo, with all of its accompanying crises and the heightened danger of accidental war.

ECONOMIC COMPETITION

The automatic response of distrust and disbelief displayed toward most Soviet disarmament proposals stems from the disillusionment of postwar hopes of cooperation. It has served, however, to prevent, among most Western scholars, a serious analysis of those forces at work in Soviet society which make a sincere attempt at disarmament decidedly in the Soviet national interest. Seymour Melman has perhaps come closest in his suggestion that a radical shift of emphasis in the Cold War from military to economic competition would, in effect, force the Soviets along the road toward disarmament, if only to meet Western competition with an economy whose resources are already stretched to the breaking point.¹² The evidences of Soviet willing-

(Continued on page 244)

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¹⁰ Scott, John, *The Soviet Economic Offensive: A Report on Ruble Diplomacy*, to the Publisher of *Time*, *The Weekly News Magazine*, Time Inc., 1961, p. 83.

¹¹ Scott, John, *ibid.*, p. 80.

¹² For a fuller discussion, see Melman, Seymour, *The Peace Race*, Ballantine Books, New York, 1962, pp. 65-145.

Discussing Soviet relations with the uncommitted nations in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, this writer credits "the post-Stalinist rise in Soviet prestige and influence among the uncommitted countries . . ." to "Western diplomatic ineptness in dealing with neutralists, and . . . shrewd Soviet support" at timely moments.

Russia and the Uncommitted Nations

By ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

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THE MAJOR development in Soviet foreign policy since 1955 is the change in strategy from a continental to a global orientation. Nowhere has this change unfolded more dramatically than in the "gray" areas between the Soviet and Western spheres of influence—the neutralist countries of Southern Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and most recently, Latin America. There have been occasional setbacks for Moscow, but the over-all balance sheet shows strong credit accumulations, and the potential for the future extension of Soviet influence is even more promising.

An important forum for the Soviet courtship of underdeveloped countries is the United Nations, with its regional economic commissions and special agencies. In the years before Soviet bilateral aid became widely sought after by the neutralist countries to supplement their economic and military growth, Moscow used the various international organizations to bring its offers to the attention of prospective recipients. The pattern was always the same: first, a lengthy attack on Western trading and monopolistic practices, interference with local efforts to industrialize, and persistent profit drain; then dire warnings of the danger of subordinating young economies to Western interests through the grant of military bases and economic privileges in return for foreign aid; finally, as

a glowing contrast, the disinterested and generous character of Soviet aid offers. For example, at one session of the Economic and Social Council the Soviet delegate noted that:

a) . . . the Soviet Union was prepared to develop its trade with the underdeveloped countries on the basis of equality of rights and mutual advantage. It was prepared to consider the conclusion of long term contracts with the countries of Asia and the Far and Near East and other underdeveloped countries for the purchase of goods from those countries in exchange for Soviet goods, bearing in mind the possibility of agreeing on stable prices for a lengthy period and settling accounts in national currencies of the countries concerned.

b) . . . the Soviet Union, anxious to promote the economic development of the underdeveloped countries, was prepared to supply them with industrial equipment and machinery. If the necessary agreement on conditions were reached, Soviet external trade organizations might supply industrial equipment and machinery on terms providing deferred payment.

International organizations served as a convenient framework within which to gain wide publicity for Soviet proposals and propaganda.

To further its comprehensive courtship of the uncommitted nations and to encourage them in their disputes with the West, Moscow has extended almost \$7 billion bilaterally in economic and military aid. It has stressed, instead of outright aid, long-term, low-interest loans repayable in local currency and com-

modities; expanded trade; provided military equipment; and lent diplomatic support in situations and times deemed critical by these countries.

The Soviet explanation for the economic backwardness of the underdeveloped countries, an updated variant of the Leninist theory of imperialism, finds a ready audience among the élites in Africa, the Middle East, and other areas where the Western legacy has left poverty and resentment. It has appeal because it throws the burden for their present underdeveloped condition on the West, and not on themselves. The Soviet line of argument maintains that the majority of underdeveloped countries had been subjected to colonial domination for a long time and their backwardness is the consequence. Monopolies drained the countries of their wealth in the form of exorbitant profits. They had not been permitted to develop their resources, train specialists, or build higher educational institutions. All key political and economic positions had been reserved for the foreign rulers. Is it any wonder, ask Soviet delegates rhetorically, that the underdeveloped countries are in such straits today? Coupled with this strong anti-colonialist stand are opposition to Western policies, offers of concrete assistance, and an insistence that the Soviet model for industrialization and modernization has a relevance for these countries that is lacking in the Western pattern.

A look at the Soviet record in the four key areas—Southern Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America—may help illumine the reasons for the present growing Soviet influence among the uncommitted nations and the possible future sources of discord between Moscow and neutralist leaders.

SOUTHERN ASIA

The Soviet campaign to cultivate underdeveloped countries began in Southern Asia. The prime target is India, the most populous, strategically situated, and, by virtue of its leading role among other neutralists, politically important. Soviet prestige in New Delhi is higher now than at any time in the post-war period. At a time when India is experi-

encing growing difficulties in its foreign relations with the West, the support of Moscow is particularly welcome. The reasons for friendly Soviet-Indian relations are rooted in the character of India's current security problems and in Moscow's political objectives.

Fifteen years after independence, India finds itself without a dependable ally on its borders: several of its neighbors are openly hostile. Pakistan is permanently alienated because of Kashmir; Nepal objects to India's big-brother, patronizing attitude, and to its tacit support for the Nepalese revolutionaries, based in northern India, who seek to overthrow the ruling King Mahendra; China is forcing India to divert precious resources to a military buildup in disputed, sparsely populated areas of the Himalayas; and Burma regards India coolly because of an unassimilable, wealthy, and influential minority.

In this situation, India has found a staunch supporter in the U.S.S.R. Friendship with Moscow rests upon a community of mutually reinforcing interests. Moscow supports New Delhi's opposition to the American-sponsored Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (Seato), to the vestiges of Western colonialism in Africa and Asia, and to the deepening American involvement in South Vietnam and Laos. During the Goa affair of December, 1961, the Soviet Union alone among the Great Powers fully upheld India's action. On Kashmir, Moscow has long upheld India's claims against Pakistan, which is militarily allied with the United States, and has thwarted repeated efforts in the Security Council to take some effective action. Moscow's neutrality on the Sino-Indian border dispute has angered the Chinese and been much appreciated by the Indians. Even though it is linked militarily and ideologically with Peking, on this issue Moscow has maintained a discreet silence.

The economic assistance extended by the Soviet Union, and its Eastern European satellites, in the past seven years, has been an important addition to India's planned economic development. Since undertaking its foreign aid program in 1955, the Soviet government has lent India more than \$800 million for

various industrial projects, including the construction of the much advertised and highly successful steel plant at Bhilai, the first government-owned oil refinery, and the foundations of a pharmaceutical industry. Moscow has probably extended more economic aid to India than it has to Communist China.

Recently, there have been reports that India may purchase two squadrons of supersonic MIG 21 jet fighters from the Soviet Union. If concluded, this transaction would be the first step toward reorienting India's procurement of military equipment from British to Soviet supply sources. Both the United States and Great Britain are seeking to dissuade India from such a move, which could jeopardize the future of Western aid to India. But the United States decision to supply Pakistan with Sabre jets has occasioned new fears among Indian military leaders. The Soviet offer is particularly attractive since Moscow has expressed a willingness to build a plant in India to produce the MIG's.

Friendship with India serves the Kremlin well in its drive for influence among neutralist countries. It demonstrates to the wary Afro-Asians that closer relations with the Soviet bloc can bring them tangible economic, military, and political dividends; it encourages India to pursue its policy of non-alignment, thus forestalling the formation of a united anti-Communist coalition in Asia; it serves as a convenient, long-term hedge against an ambitious Chinese expansionism which may, in time, further split the Communist world; and it provides the Communist Party of India with a respectability which may make the C.P.I. a major force in India political life, if not in the near future, then within a decade.

Soviet objectives function on several planes. Moscow's ultimate goal is a Communist India which would look to Moscow, rather than Peking, for guidance in international relations. But for the moment, friendship with India, buttressed by strong diplomatic support and generous economic assistance, makes better politics and best serves Soviet interests.

Afghanistan and Indonesia are also recipients of extensive Soviet economic and military aid. In both situations, the Soviet way has

been paved by the political quarrels of these countries with Western Powers or with their allies. Thus, Afghanistan's feud with Pakistan, which has several times cut land-locked Afghanistan's trade route to the outside world, afforded Moscow a golden opportunity. In addition to facilitating the transit of Afghan exports through Soviet territory, the Soviet government extended economic loans and military equipment. Its commitments have exceeded \$220 million. This amount is larger than that given to any other neutralist except India, Indonesia, and Egypt, whose populations are much larger.

Though Moscow extended more than \$500 million in credits to Indonesia, its record there has been unimpressive. Most of the credits have been spent on military equipment by the Sukarno regime which appears more concerned with gaining control over Dutch-held West New Guinea, than with promoting the country's economic development. Potentially the richest nation in Asia because of its resources, Indonesia remains undeveloped, unstable, and beset by internal problems. Soviet bloc economic aid has done little to stimulate development: breakdowns in equipment, and tardy deliveries of spare parts have been the Indonesian experience with Soviet economic assistance. But in its buildup for a possible showdown with the Netherlands, Indonesia has found Moscow a willing supplier of military equipment; and this overshadows the disappointments with Soviet technical and economic aid.

LAOS

In recent months, attention has focused on developments in Laos. The key to South Vietnam's security against the Communist Viet Cong guerillas, and the strategic highway to Southeast Asia, Laos is a pawn in the Great Power struggle. It is not a nation but a conglomeration of tribes and ethnic groups which have no interest in politics and even less understanding of their recent diplomatic importance.

Under the agreement signed in June, 1962, at Khang Khay, Laos is to be ruled by a coalition of Right-wing, neutralist, and pro-Com-

munist factions. Prince Souvanna Phouma, the neutralist leader, is to head the coalition, assisted by two Deputy Premiers—Prince Souphanouvong, head of the pro-Communist Pathet Lao movement, and General Phoumi Nosavan, the Right-wing military leader. The durability of this coalition is highly questionable, since pro-Communist forces already control more than 60 per cent of the country.

For the time being, Moscow seems to prefer a peaceful settlement. It has been relatively moderate in its demands. Some Western observers attribute this to Moscow's desire to contain Chinese influence in the region. However, a look at a map reveals that China, which is contiguous to Laos, can easily upset a political settlement any time it so desires. It may be that, for differing reasons, Moscow and Peking prefer not to push events to a point where a full scale American military commitment might result: Moscow may be playing for time to increase its hold over local Communist movements, while Peking, beset by severe economic crises at home, is temporarily satisfied with a partial settlement which leaves the Communist Pathet Lao in a favorable position to take over all of Laos on short notice and with little effort. Should Laos fall completely under Communist control, pro-Western Thailand and South Vietnam will be faced with graver threats to their security, and the United States may be forced to escalate its military commitments in the area.

THE MIDDLE EAST

A few years ago a study published by the Library of Congress on Soviet penetration in the Middle East noted that Moscow had undertaken a three-pronged offensive aimed at undermining, and possibly replacing, Western influence in the area:

This offensive was to embrace an active good will campaign in the Arab States coupled with aloofness toward Israel, a determined purpose to participate as a principal in any future great-power political arrangements relative to the state of affairs in the Arab Middle East, and the promotion in these countries of a vigorous trade-and-aid program.

Ending Soviet isolation—the consequence of Stalin's inflexible adherence to a bipolar

conception of political alignments—has proved easy; however, Moscow has not been able to accrue the influence it hoped would be forthcoming as a reward for its aid and support. The festering Egyptian-Israeli struggle led Nasser to seek modern military equipment. Moscow quickly obliged. The 1955 arms deal, coupled with Soviet support at the time of the Suez invasion of October, 1956, enhanced Moscow's status in Cairo, and gave the Soviets the opportunity they sought. Trade between the two countries expanded. In 1958, the Soviet government agreed to help finance and construct the Aswan High Dam, the grandiose project which Egypt hopes will increase its arable lands by 25 per cent and will provide the electric power to facilitate industrialization of the country.

By 1961, however, relations between the two countries were correct but not cordial. Cairo's crackdown on local Communists more than once led Khrushchev to criticize the Nasser regime. But no split is in sight. Egypt derives economic aid for its development projects and the latest military equipment for its army from the Soviet bloc. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union encourages Nasser's anti-Western policies, and binds him ever tighter to economic and military dependence, through Soviet purchases of cotton and Soviet replacements for military equipment.

But the Soviets are playing an ill-concealed game of divide-and-dominate which limits their maneuverability in the area. Egypt's rival for leadership of the Arab bloc is Iraq, which since the 1958 overthrow of the pro-Western Faisal regime has been led by General Abdul Karim Kassim. Much to the annoyance of Nasser, Moscow has extended economic and military aid to Kassim's regime. Kassim, however, has kept the Soviets at arm's length, cracking down hard on local Communists, and criticizing the prices of Soviet goods and the tardiness of deliveries and plant assemblings. Soviet technicians have been unimpressive in action and Iraq has experienced a noticeable disenchantment with Soviet assistance.

Another source of Iraqi pique has been Moscow's encouragement of Kurdish nation-

alism. The Kurds are a tough, militant, tribal people who have long been at odds with established authorities in Iran, Turkey, and Iraq. The Soviets have sought to use them, since the end of World War II, as a wedge against the pro-Western Iranian and Turkish regimes. Kassim believes that Moscow is not averse to inciting the Kurds to revolt against Baghdad's authority, in the hope of paving the way for a Communist takeover. For the time being, he follows a neutralist policy, and seeks to keep local Communists fragmented and weak, while accepting military and diplomatic support from the Soviet Union. In recent months, Moscow has made diligent efforts to expand trade with Iraq, and has assumed responsibility for building a steel mill.

Political circumstances frequently seemed tailored to Soviet needs. Just as Iraqi-Soviet relations were experiencing difficulties, the problem of Kuwait afforded Moscow an opportunity to demonstrate its political support by vetoing that former British protectorate's application for admission to the United Nations. Iraq contends that Kuwait, the world's second largest oil exporter, is part of its own territory, legally and historically. Egypt, on the other hand, supported Kuwait's admission for United Nations membership. On this critical issue, Moscow stood with Iraq, a matter greatly appreciated by the Kassim regime.

Soviet penetration of the Middle East has proceeded as a consequence of Arab-Western antagonism, of tangible Soviet economic, military, and political support for the Arab countries, and of the deep-seated rivalries that permeate the Middle East.

AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

The struggle for Africa is in its initial phase. European domination is coming to an end as more and more former colonies acquire independence, the latest being Burundi and Rwanda in Central Africa (July, 1962). Moscow, realizing that it is on the threshold of unrivalled opportunity, generally is playing a cautious hand. Soviet strategy is attempting to adapt to the conditions of Africa, to formulate an organizational weapon which can strike for political power. There are no Afri-

can proletariat, no well-organized Communist parties, and no divisive class antagonisms. African societies are largely agrarian and rural, rent by tribal feuds, but united in their hostility toward the white man. In such a setting, traditional Communist tactics demand revision.

An immediate Soviet objective is to exploit African resentment against the remaining possessions of the European Powers and the deep-rooted fears of Western influence. The Soviets expect African-Western relations to deteriorate, and in the ensuing crises they hope to turn developments to their advantage. Meanwhile they are trying to convince the neutralist African states that they can depend on unstinting Soviet diplomatic support and on modest amounts of economic and technical aid. They have embarked on a foreign aid program, with emphasis on Ghana and Guinea. For a while, Soviet leaders had hoped to make them Communist showcases in Africa. They extended \$200 million in credits to Ghana and \$100 million to Guinea. Many trade and cultural missions were sent, and Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah and Guinea's Sekou Touré visited Moscow.

Despite the anti-Western neutralist bent of Ghana and Guinea, they have not shown themselves to be easy targets for Communist penetration. Their leaders, though Marxists, have shown no inclination to replace their former Western rulers with Soviet commissars. An attempt by the previous Soviet Ambassador to Guinea to interfere in local politics led to his expulsion and occasioned a hasty visit by Anastas Mikoyan, the Kremlin's trouble-shooter, to repair the damage. The result of this incident has been a greater willingness by Guinea to consider the establishment of closer ties with the United States.

The Soviet aid record, thus far, is marred by experts who do not speak the local language, frequent breakdowns of equipment which is not suited to tropical conditions, and an inability to offer much constructive assistance in the fields of agriculture and light industry, the main areas of African need.

In the Congo, the Soviets have been effectively rebuffed and they seem resigned to

waiting for another opportunity for infiltration. The United Nations has succeeded in forestalling anarchy and Communist inroads, but whether it can bring stability and a settlement of the Katanga secession remains to be seen.

Moscow places great reliance upon propaganda and education as avenues for achieving contact with African intellectuals. It finds that "socialism" exerts wide appeal among these groups, many of whom were schooled in Western institutions. But, from available evidence, it seems Moscow fails to appreciate the peculiarly *African* features of their aspirations and attitudes. The dynamic forces sweeping Africa are nationalism and a race-conscious Africanism. Where nationalist goals conflict with orthodox Communist prescriptions for political rule and modernization, as they will increasingly in the future, Moscow may find that conditions in Africa, far from being ripe for Communist pickings, are antithetical and resistant to Soviet penetration.

LATIN AMERICA

The Soviet Union is trying to improve its relations with the few Latin American states with which it has formal diplomatic ties; and it seeks to obtain diplomatic recognition from, and exchange ambassadors with, the countries of the hemisphere which have thus far refused to deal with it. Extensive diplomatic recognition is a necessary preliminary to Moscow's more ambitious designs of encouraging Latin American neutralism, through increased trade, cultural missions, and selective loans, and thereby undermining the Western Hemispheric solidarity of the past generation. The re-establishment of diplomatic relations and the exchange of ambassadors between Brazil and the U.S.S.R. in April, 1962, was a victory for Russian diplomacy.

At present, Latin America is low on the list of Soviet target areas. Heavily committed elsewhere in the underdeveloped world, and faced with growing demands upon its resources at home and within the Soviet bloc, the Soviet Union does not seem presently capable of offering large loans to many Latin

American countries. Though it has extended a \$100 million credit to Argentina for petroleum development, and more than twice that amount to Cuba for military equipment and machinery, these are exceptions to the general pattern of Soviet activity.

Moscow's most promising avenue of approach to Latin American countries is through expanded trade. Many of these countries, e.g., Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, have burdensome surpluses of primary commodities and might, if Soviet offers were attractive, be prepared to enter into barter agreements with the Soviet Union. Aware of their precarious economic condition, Moscow has used United Nations forums to advertise the benefits of trade with the U.S.S.R. At a recent meeting of the Economic and Social Council, the Soviet delegate deplored "the absence of normal trade relations between the socialist countries and Latin America." He noted that "each year the U.S.S.R. was buying more raw materials from the underdeveloped countries. Those purchases could be further increased to the benefit of the less industrialized countries if they would restore normal economic relations with the U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies." He then stressed the harm which the Common Market might do to vulnerable Latin American export economies and implied that Latin American countries could find dependable markets in the Soviet bloc. Holding out the olive branch and the checkbook, the Soviet delegate asserted that "if they decided to change their

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"Although objectively the Soviet Union is an ideocracy, i.e., a society governed not by men but by ideas, subjectively it is not. . . ." As this author points out, "In actuality, decisions are reached not by logical deduction, but by pragmatic adjustment to the survival problem, not so much of Russia as of those in power."

Soviet Ideology for the 1960's

By N. S. TIMASHEFF

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TODAY, IT is commonly taken for granted, and rightly so, that great changes are going on in the Soviet Union. Of course, they do not reach so far as to impair the absolute dominance of the Communist party and, for the time being, of its supreme leader, Nikita S. Khrushchev. But the economic organization has been twice reformed: first, in the spirit of administrative decentralization and second, in the opposite direction.

Collective farms are no longer under the direct supervision of the Machine and Tractor Stations. Capitalist incentives, such as the lifting of prices paid by the state to the farms for milk and butter, have recently been revived. Penal law has been revised to abolish barbarian survivals of the earlier stages of the Communist period. Concentration camps are now less numerous and less populated than under Stalin.

On the other hand, capital punishment has been expanded to many crimes against the economic order of the new society. Teams of vigilantes have been created with undetermined competence, but with far reaching authority to impose penalties on those found guilty of behavior incompatible with the new mentality that should prevail in a society striving for communism. A radical reform of the educational system is continuing, officially aimed at filling the gap between manual

and intellectual work. And the inscrutable Khrushchev now rarely displays the bellicose spirit which, in 1960, exploded the planned "meeting at the summit."

The Soviet Union continues to be an "ideocracy," i.e., a society officially governed not by men, but by a system of ideas called Marxism-Leninism. Thus it is only natural to suppose that the officially accepted and imposed ideology is also changing. The present time is especially propitious for checking this hypothesis, because in the fall of 1961, a new program of the Communist party was endorsed by the Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

This is a formidable document covering 164 printed pages in the official Russian version. It consists of two parts. The first exposes the creed of the Communist leaders and diagnoses the present world situation. The second is actually a combination of a 10-year plan and a 20-year plan based on the premise that the phase of building socialism has already passed; and that the next step is achieving the final goal, communism. The official distinction between socialism and communism belongs to the untouchable part of the official creed. Shortly before his final disgrace, Vyacheslav M. Molotov was bitterly accused of a slight deviation from the official doctrine with respect to this distinction.

In the West, the difference is commonly

believed to be one between the means advocated for creating a classless society based on the wholesale nationalization of the means of production (at the present time no Socialist party of any importance in the West demands such nationalization). The Socialists advocate democratic means such as those employed in England and France in 1945–1946 when nationalization was in vogue. Communists declare that without the use of violence their goals cannot be achieved.

The Russian Communists, from the very start, gave to the difference another interpretation found in Marx's latest works and in Lenin's writings. Socialism and communism are declared to be stages in the accomplishment of the final goal which is communism. During the Socialist period immediately following the overthrow of the capitalist order of production, classes cannot be entirely abolished; the prerequisite of communism, plenty of goods to satisfy the needs of everybody, cannot be achieved immediately after the "expropriation of the expropriators," i.e., the capitalists. Therefore, reward for labor must remain differentiated "according to everybody's contribution." When plenty is reached—and this will necessarily take place since the means of production will be fully utilized—the second and last phase of the development of society after the social revolution will be reached: to provide everybody "according to needs."

The distinction between the Socialist and the Communist stages forms the backbone of the new program of the Communist party. The previous program written by Lenin in 1919 concentrated on the steps necessary for achieving socialism which, contrary to Communist expectations, was not achieved immediately after the revolution because Russia's economy was deeply shaken by the war, the two revolutions of 1917 and the ensuing civil war.

By 1961, i.e., at the time of the final formulation of the new program, the economy was not only reconstructed, but had made spectacular advances above the 1940 level, except for agriculture. Agricultural development

remained far behind that of industry on which the government's efforts had concentrated since the inauguration of the five year plans (1928). Hence the motto of the new program: socialism has been achieved; let us not relax, but struggle fiercely for the last step in the development of mankind, leading to communism.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNISM

It would be impossible to summarize the content of the activities outlined by the new 10-year and 20-year plans forming the second part of the new program. A few peculiarities of these plans can be seen in the light of the total development of communism from its embryonic state in the minds of Marx and Lenin toward the Paradise Promised. First of all, there is no trace of the early expectations that communism will be automatically achieved; many years of work are still needed. Second, the program does not assert that communism will be totally realized even by 1980, the terminal year of the 20-year plan.

Adequate housing for every family is promised, although not at the level of the living conditions of the Communist potentates today. Moreover, people will no longer have to pay for housing. Public services will be rendered free of charge; this is not of great importance because at the present time they are offered for relatively little. The real trouble is not the cost but frequent unavailability. Education and medical services are free today. The program promises many more nurseries and public dining rooms so that women will be finally liberated from the millennial yoke of home-making and child rearing. But money will not be abolished although this might be expected if all the needs of the people could be satisfied. A shorter work week is promised. Wage compensation for labor will remain.

The Communist paradise will be long in coming and the time of its achievement remains uncertain. In one of his speeches Khrushchev promised the audience that their children and grandchildren would live in this utopia. In contrast, in 1917, the Bolsheviks (who later started to call themselves Com-

munists) asserted that socialism was just around the corner. One of the iron laws of politics has been manifested in these changes, namely, that coming to power always sobers the new leaders. Experience teaches them that any attempt to accelerate human development meets resistance.

Let us turn to the first part of the program. A reader familiar with the history of Marxism-Leninism (which less than ten years ago, was still Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism) has a startling experience: many paragraphs and sections are simply reproduced from older documents, namely the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848 and Lenin's *State and Revolution* (1917). Today, it is well known to all except die-hard Marxists that one of Marx's basic errors was his interpretation of the society in which he lived. He described capitalist society as decayed and dying. Today we know that this society was undergoing the birth pains of neo-capitalism (which might also be called neo-socialism). The new program remains blind—as was Lenin's program of 1917—to the real development of "capitalist society" after the 1830's and 1840's.

What was true (though exaggerated) at the inception of Communist doctrine, is asserted to be true today. Capitalism, i.e., the social system leaving the means of production in the possession of privileged individuals or their corporations, condemns the labor class to inexorable "immiseration," i.e., the steady decline of labor's standard of living and periodic unemployment. "A considerable part of the production plant stands idle, while millions of unemployed wait at factory gates"—this is a direct quotation from the new program. Since the principle of capitalism is aggressive acquisitiveness, cut-throat competition among capitalists is declared inevitable. Since those who possess economic power also have political power, wars between capitalist states are inevitable and become more and more devastating.

A PEACEFUL PATH

In one regard, and a very important one, the new program differs radically from that of 1919. The new program emphatically as-

serts that violence is by no means the only possible path to the final triumph of communism throughout the world. When the splendor of communism is achieved and demonstrated, even the richest bourgeois (capitalist) societies may voluntarily accept the new gospel and become Communist. This prediction seems to be partly verified by facts: quite a few "decolonized" areas have become independent states and have accepted the Communist formula of economic advance as it appears in reality: a highly centralized power group is formed; the rest of the population is enslaved; and the Communist order of production is used without mercy to develop at high speed an industrial system "liberating" these areas and their populations from dependency on their former masters and their efficient industrial establishment.

It is noteworthy that, contrary to the predictions of Marx and Lenin, the doctrine is accepted for guidance in the least developed parts of the world. This happened 45 years ago in Russia and some 15 years ago in China; some 5 years ago, in Cuba; and, as has already been mentioned, is happening in some of the former French and English colonies in Asia and Africa. The new Party program mentions some of these facts, but distorts them to confirm the basic doctrine of communism.

On the contrary, the advanced nations of the West, the United States, Great Britain, Western Germany, France and the Lowlands display no symptoms of falling in the trap of communism. In these advanced countries the movement is not toward socialism-communism, but toward an improved and amended capitalism, the term denoting that at least the major part of the means of production remains privately owned and that even the nationalized sector of industry is managed almost exactly as these particular enterprises were managed before their nationalization. This seems not to prophesy the shift of these societies to communism by democratic means.

However, the program repeats several times that violence, either in the form of a social revolution or of war between the Communist

and capitalist camps, is by no means necessary and desirable, not only because of the terrible loss in men and goods, but because communism will inevitably follow capitalism. In the program we read; "Socialism will inevitably succeed capitalism everywhere. Such is the objective law of social development. Imperialism is powerless to check the irresistible process of emancipation." During the past few years, especially during his visit to the United States, Khrushchev has many times repeated the phrase: "We [i.e., the Communists] will bury you [i.e., the capitalists]." He willingly explained that what he meant was not victory in a final war to be waged by mankind, but the inevitable march of events regulated by "iron laws" discovered by Marx and Lenin. Capitalism will not be the last phase in the evolution of human society, but just the penultimate; the highest and last stage is socialism-communism, and this stage will come independently of human will.

This, by the way, was the teaching of the German Social-Democrats prior to World War II, and of the Russian Mensheviks whom the Communists exterminated on Russian soil. These two parties did not deny the possibility of the peaceful achievement of their goals, which Lenin emphatically denied. The reversal of the official Soviet ideology is perhaps the most important change on the ideological level made explicit in the new program, and perhaps one of the most important sources of the Russo-Chinese conflict of our day.

This interpretation of Marxism is however diametrically opposed to Lenin's real teaching on the subject. How can the contemporary leaders of the Russian Communist party and, *de facto*, of all the Communist parties except those of Albania, China and the latter's satellites, reconcile their formula with the well-known teachings of Lenin, especially in his *State and Revolution* (1917), and still assert that they are Marxist-Leninists? How can they speak, in the new program, of "the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence" and assert that "the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems was put forward by Lenin"? It seems

almost impossible to impose such a lie (because it is a lie!) on people who, at the present time, are, in their great majority, literate and who are ordered at school to study assiduously Lenin's works. But this is one of the great advantages of unlimited power; those in power dare make easily refutable statements because they know that no one will risk refuting them.

The prestige of Lenin has been cultivated in place of the notorious "cult of personality" of Stalin's day. Thus, it is probably impossible for the leaders to acknowledge that, with respect to one of the major issues of our time, they have entirely negated Lenin's doctrine. However, beginning with a speech made in Bucharest in the fall of 1960, Khrushchev has several times asserted that Marxism-Leninism is not a petrified doctrine, but is subject to change. In this particular case, Russian leaders could have emphasized that Lenin himself consciously and explicitly departed from Marx. Soviet leaders could then point to some statements of the aging Marx explicitly acknowledging the possibility of a peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism. It would not have been easy for these leaders to extricate themselves from difficulties arising from that fact that Marx acknowledged the possibility of peaceful transition in England, the United States and possibly Holland, countries where the Communist doctrine attracted only small minorities.

PRACTICAL EFFECTS

What is the practical significance of the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union? Its second part will probably affect Soviet planning agencies which will try to conform to the directions contained in the program, at least as long as Khrushchev remains in power. But in future years the planners will be affected by discrepancies between expectations and real achievements. Finally, another party congress, led by the person who will be in power at that time (Khrushchev or someone else), may substantially change the goals.

What of the first part of the program, the worldwide diagnosis of the present and the

prognosis of the future? There was a time when serious scholars, in this country and outside, completed manuals consisting of excerpts from the works of Marx-Lenin-Stalin (because no one foresaw the posthumous degradation of the last of the trio). These manuals, their authors believed, would be of great help in predicting the behavior of the men in the Kremlin. The expectation was wrong: although objectively the Soviet Union is an ideocracy, i.e., a society governed not by men, but by ideas, subjectively it is not. The art of plausible misinterpretation of ideological writings and even their partial suppression has been highly developed in the Soviet Union.

In actuality, decisions are reached not by logical deduction, but by pragmatic adjustment to the survival problem, not so much of Russia as of those in power. Once a decision is reached, directions are given to a whole staff of efficient secretaries well versed in the writings of the classics; these experts rapidly compile pertinent quotations to confirm the decisions. The task is easier because Marx, Lenin and Stalin, like almost all politicians, often changed their views and successively declared themselves for propositions in contradiction to those they professed a short time earlier. As has already been stated, the rulers' danger of being indicted for inconsistency or contradiction in the Soviet Union is almost nil.

Nevertheless, the official doctrine of Marxism-Leninism contained in the primary sources and now in the new program still remains a very useful tool for maintaining power within the Kremlin and spreading the influence of the men in the Kremlin in the outside world. First, the doctrine has remained a mighty instrument of propaganda: the fallacious description of conditions existing in capitalist societies has been accepted widely by the peoples "liberated" from colonialism. A similar effect appears, under certain conditions, in advanced societies: namely among those at the bottom of the social ladder, if the particular societies are not endowed with a long tradition of constitutionalism and local self-government.

The effectiveness of the doctrine on the international scene is given a high value by the rulers of the Soviet Union. For example, the policy of relative toleration of the Church can be best explained by the possibility of enrolling churchmen of almost all denominations represented in the Soviet Union for the endorsement of that part of the program which asserts that the Soviet Union is the only peace-loving society on earth while the "capitalist" world is led by war-mongers.

The new Party program will also be very helpful in Soviet education. All the students, ranging from the youngest to those in institutions of higher learning, must study "dialectical materialism," i.e., the theoretical background of Communist society. No margin of freedom is left to the Soviet teachers; they are obliged to teach according to official textbooks, and no independent reading is expected from the students. The course will certainly become an exposition of the first part of the program of the Party; on higher levels, the so-called Marxist philosophy will be taught, and a kind of pseudo-sociology will be added in which all the propositions—as has always been the case in the Soviet Union—will be derived from the official philosophy.

In consequence, such doctrines as the inevitable immiseration of the labor class under capitalism and the inevitable victory of communism throughout the world will be presented as scientifically proven propositions. The Communists are always eager to assert that their doctrine is really scientific, uncovering the necessary stages of the development of human societies and class struggle as the

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"In the military and strategic industry fields, Communist China is very much dependent on the Soviet Union." Thus, from the Chinese viewpoint, "whatever dissatisfaction exists vis a vis Moscow must be balanced by the realities of the power struggle." At the same time, as this specialist points out, although "at least from an economic point of view, one can hardly imagine a greater liability than 700 million hungry Chinese," the Russians "find it handy to have an Asian 'ally'. . . ."

The Russo-Chinese Alliance

By RODGER SWEARINGEN

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How serious is the alleged rift between Moscow and Peking? Is Chinese communism different from Soviet communism? Is a break between the Soviet Union and Communist China imminent? What is mainland China's place in the world of communism?

To the philosopher, the historian and the "old China hand," the present situation in China appears as only a turbulent phase of China's long history of reaction to foreign cultures. The Chinese have alternatively rejected or adapted to their own needs the foreign philosophies and systems which have entered China.

From the perspective of certain specialists in Soviet affairs, to many former Communists and to a number of conservative United States senators, the emergence of a Communist China reveals, rather, the familiar Communist pattern of organization, infiltration, propaganda, intrigue, force, and finally, take-over. Communism is communism, this school asserts, wherever it rears its ugly head, and China is no exception.

RUSSIA IS RUSSIA, CHINA IS CHINA

To be sure, Communist leaders in Moscow and Peking operate from similar Marxist-Leninist principles and equally regard the United States as their main enemy. At the same time, we could do well to remind our-

selves that Russia is Russia and China is China. This one obvious fact accounts for several fundamental differences between the two giants of the Communist camp—differences which condition the thinking of the leaders of the two nations towards each other and towards the world.

National cultural tradition. Power, arrogance, expansionism and distrust of anything foreign have all characterized China throughout her history. From the dawn of Western civilization well into the modern period, China was the recognized leader of Asia. Areas on the periphery of Asia, including Japan, acknowledged their linguistic, cultural, religious and literary indebtedness to China. China regarded herself proudly as the middle kingdom—the center of the universe.

Everywhere in the Communist world, "This is my own, my native land," has shown itself a feeling at least as strong as if not noticeably more powerful than "Workers of the world, unite! . . ."

Historical experience with the West. Centuries of experience with Western imperialism have left an indelible mark on China. "Unequal treaties," "gunboat diplomacy," "treaty ports," "international settlements," "second-rate citizen"—these are all terms which conjure up bitter memories in the minds of the Chinese. These terms are largely meaningless to most Russians. Russia has

simply not been the target of the kind of Western imperialism that consumed China during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Thus, the Chinese Communists can reinforce Marxist-Leninist slogans with a long and impressive list of grievances against the West.

Stage of economic development. China is a "have not" nation. The U.S.S.R. is (relatively) a "have" nation. If there is still imbalance between Soviet industry and agriculture, there is far less than in China, and the imbalance is somewhat corrected by the extensive foreign trade of the U.S.S.R. The imbalance between a huge, growing population and China's relatively decreasing amount of arable land is becoming a very serious problem.

These stages of development differences and growing difficulties led the Chinese Communists to introduce the communes in 1958. Accordingly, Communist China has developed economic (agricultural and industrial) and political (administrative, military and Party) organizations and practices that are very different from those performing the same functions in the Soviet Union.

Party history and organization. There have been some very real differences in the history of the Chinese and Soviet Communist parties, differences which relate to the strategy by which each came to power and to the methods by which each has sought to transform society and expand its influence. While specialists continue to debate the degree of originality in the Maoist formula, there is no question that the Chinese Communist leadership has preferred its own solution, as opposed to Moscow's formula, on enough occasions to be significant.

The overseas Chinese. Some 12.5 million Chinese reside abroad. In the countries of Southeast Asia they comprise a significant percentage of the population—one-half the population of Malaya, some three million in Thailand. Further, they have shown themselves excellent businessmen, and their influence on the business and industry of these countries has been substantial. They have maintained separate Chinese schools for their children. They look to China as their cultural home. Their political orientation has not been easy to assess. So far, their loyalties appear divided. Many have declared them-

selves openly for the Communists, though recent events in Communist China have apparently had a sobering effect on many overseas Chinese.

The contrast with the Russian situation is marked. Few Russians reside in Southeast Asia. Most "overseas Russians" left the country for political reasons and are outspokenly anti-Communist. Clearly, this contrasting situation must be one of which Peking persistently reminds Moscow.

HISTORICAL TIES WITH MOSCOW

The record of the Chinese Communist's ties with Moscow is a long and complicated one beyond the scope of this brief consideration. Three or four points may be worth noting because they condition attitudes and suggest nuances in the present situation. First, the Chinese Communist party was established in 1921 under the guidance of the Comintern. Comintern personnel, Comintern policy-guidance and Comintern funds were all instrumental in creating the early Party. Secondly, the party at its second Congress officially joined the Comintern as one of its branches, a relationship which it maintained despite disagreements. Thirdly, at several periods throughout its history, Soviet assistance to the Chinese Communists has been important. Noteworthy in this respect are the years, 1924–1927, when Soviet political and military advisors to the nationalist revolutionary government in South China used their position to advance communism in China. Similarly, during the immediate postwar years, 1945–1947, Soviet military forces in Manchuria assisted the Chinese Communists in Yen-an by turning over to the Red Army—or allowing to fall into Chinese Communist hands—millions of items of captured Japanese weapons and equipment.

At the same time a fourth factor must be added to balance the picture: To a great extent after 1927 Mao Tse-tung operated in the countryside with policies and programs that were at odds with Moscow policy.

RECENT SINO-SOVIET DISAGREEMENTS

What about recent Sino-Soviet disagreements? If throughout the troubled 41-year history of the Communist Party of China, there have been rumors and some intermittent evidence of disagreement with Moscow, in

recent years the rumors have increased in number and credibility, while the evidence of serious disagreement has become firm and impressive. There is now no doubt that there are serious areas of difference between Moscow and Peking. Significantly, such disagreements and dissatisfaction run the gamut—from ideology to practice.

Ideological disagreement. For the first six years, the Moscow-Peking Axis managed to conceal or resolve its ideological differences. Serious trouble, however, occurred in connection with Khrushchev's anti-Stalin speech at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. Apparently, Mao Tse-tung had no previous knowledge of Khrushchev's major speech. The Chinese Communists were thus put in a position of not having even been consulted on the policy that was presumably to become binding on Communists throughout the world. Further, as it developed, it was a policy which the Chinese Communists opposed. Ideological differences have since centered on: (a) the formula for achieving communism within the country, i.e., the "road to socialism" and (b) the formula for relations with the "capitalist" world, i.e., Soviet co-existence versus Chinese Communist emphasis on a sustained militant offensive. At issue in the latter case is none other than the question of nuclear war or peace with the West.

COMMUNES AND CO-EXISTENCE

When Mao Tse-tung first proposed the "great leap forward," suggesting that by forming great collective communes, China would skip over the stage of industrialization and socialism and move directly into communism, Khrushchev commented: "We tried communes in Russia, and they didn't work!" That remark, though made in Poland and without actually mentioning China by name, set off a major ideological feud between the two Communist nations. What makes it doubly painful for Mao is that events have proved Khrushchev correct: China is on the brink of economic disaster—a condition in some substantial part of its own making.

Moscow and Peking have equally been at odds on the theoretical question of co-existence with the West. To put the issue in a nutshell: Moscow regards co-existence, i.e., the absence of nuclear war, as (a) absolutely

essential in the hydrogen age, and as (b) good political strategy. Peking, on the other hand, regards co-existence as tantamount to consorting with the enemy.

The economic aid issue. Given the dimension of Communist China's present economic crisis and future problems, reports of Peking's "dissatisfaction" with the spirit and amount of Soviet economic aid are likely true. Chinese Communist leaders are thought to be especially unhappy with Soviet aid to India. Why not keep it in the family?

Certainly, Soviet assistance to China in terms of loans, long term credits, and technical assistance, while substantial, has not been anything like what might have been expected by such a "close" and needy ally.

Woven into China's dissatisfaction with Soviet economic and technical assistance has been trouble with Russian advisers. A former Chinese Communist official who recently fled to Hong Kong puts it this way: "Who were these foreign advisers? Soviet experts, of course, who looked down on us condescendingly from the height of their own arrogance and experience."

Looked at from the Moscow perspective, sprawling China—Communist or not—with a hungry, growing population more than three times as large as the population of the Soviet Union, must be regarded as a distinct economic liability—an impossible situation.

A story circulating in Moscow and Warsaw puts the problem concisely: One Russian says to another, "What's the difference between an optimist and a pessimist?" His friend replies, "I don't know, what is the difference between an optimist and a pessimist?" The first Russian answers, "An optimist studies Russian. A pessimist studies Chinese!"

Military and strategic questions. One conspicuous characteristic of Soviet military aid to Communist China is that it has been focused on tactical rather than strategic capabilities: fighter aircraft rather than long-range bombers; tanks rather than submarines (although there have been reports that Moscow has provided Communist China with several submarines).

There is no evidence that Moscow is willing to provide the Chinese ally with even tactical atomic warheads, not to mention atomic bombs and guided missiles. There is reason to suspect that the Moscow position

has been to meet Peking requests for such weapons with added assurances of Soviet protection.

A RESTRAINING INFLUENCE

Aside from Korea, where the issue is still confused, the Soviets have shown little enthusiasm, or even support, for Chinese Communist military adventures beyond the mainland Chinese borders. On the matter of the "liberation of Taiwan," and notably in the Quemoy island crisis, Moscow seems to have exerted a restraining influence. In the case of the Chinese Communist military advance over the disputed border with India, the Soviet Union appears to be backing India, even to the extent of proposing to sell India production facilities for first-line Soviet jet fighter aircraft.

Is this all part of some huge trick to confuse and subvert the West? Certainly neither the Soviet Union nor Communist China has abandoned that fundamental objective. It is worth considering, however, that Moscow may be more concerned with the possibility of nuclear war and with the dangerous aggressive tendencies of Communist China than many suppose.

Territorial disputes. The question of territorial jurisdiction of such areas of mutual Chinese and Soviet interests as North Korea, the Manchurian-Siberian border region, Sinkiang, Outer Mongolia, and even the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur could prove in the future—as they have in the past—serious matters of tension and discord.

Certainly, a restless, hungry population of some 700 million Chinese pushing out into regions which have been historically either neutral buffer states or Russian preserves can hardly be calculated to create anything but apprehension on the part of Moscow. In this context, the Soviet population figure shows up as a mere 210 million. Nor does the Soviet Union face anything like the Chinese Communist problem of overpopulation, land and food shortages. This disparity must be more irritating because it is in the family.

The status issue. Clearly, Communist China is status conscious. A number of specialists have noted apparent Chinese Communist sensitivity with respect to what they regard as Soviet high-handedness.

Mao Tse-tung, a contemporary of Stalin, shows every indication of regarding himself as an equal of the late dictator. Why should he accept a subordinate position to Khrushchev who was merely one of Stalin's assistants?

Moreover, Peking has displayed particular displeasure on more than one occasion when Khrushchev has suggested a summit meeting (without Communist China), or a meeting within the United Nations Security Council framework (with Nationalist China represented). Even the Khrushchev-Bulganin grand popularity tour through South and Southeast Asia as well as Khrushchev's trip through the United States were met in Peking with a resounding coolness.

POLYCENTRISM

Polycentrism is a term used to suggest that there are now several Romes, that the monolithic structure of international communism is cracking up. The fact is that international communism has never been unified or coordinated, not to say monolithic. Trotskyism, Bukharism, Li Li-Sanism, and so on, have all characterized the Communist movement from time to time throughout its development. What separates the era of the 1920's and the 1930's from the 1950's and 1960's is the question of power. What Tito and Mao have that Trotsky and Li Li-san never had is a territorial base of operations, absolute control of a national army and a population. When this difference is placed in the context of the cold war, it becomes highly significant and doubly dangerous to the Free World.

TWO CENTERS OF COMMUNIST POWER

Rivalry for leadership of the Communist World. Until 1949 there was a single acknowledged center of control for Communist parties throughout the world: Moscow. Since then there are two: Moscow and Peking.

Moscow might have anticipated trouble with Communist China over the leadership of the Communist parties in Asia. After all, Peking could well argue for leadership in (1) areas formerly under China's suzerainty, (2) areas with substantial overseas populations, and (3) agrarian societies of Asian peoples more like China than Russia. Moscow could then counter that India, Pakistan and Japan were exceptions on at least counts

one and two, and certainly in the case of Japan, on all three counts. The argument would then proceed from there.

As it turns out, Communist China was not thinking in such limited terms. What more dramatic evidence of this point than Communist China's 1956 intervention in the Soviet preserve, Eastern Europe. When Poland revolted, the armed forces remained under Party control. China was in favor of a degree of autonomy within the Communist sphere. Peking, therefore, backed Gomulka, and even sent Premier Chou En-lai to that troubled satellite. It has been said that only Peking's intervention prevented Khrushchev from taking military action. The Hungarian Revolution was of a different kind. It was a revolt not only against rigid Soviet control, but against communism itself. The Communist party lost control. Only Soviet tanks could keep the freedom fighters from taking Hungary out of the Soviet orbit. China is thought to have pressed for ruthless military intervention when Moscow appeared to hesitate.

CRUCIAL DIFFERENCES?

Since that time, Communist China has been actively competing with the Soviets in Africa, Latin America and elsewhere. It is, of course, possible that what we are witnessing is a masterly display of subtlety, a grandiose scheme devised by Moscow and Peking to confuse and conquer.

Moscow-Peking differences over Albania, however, point up the genuineness of Sino-Soviet disagreement. Khrushchev attacked Albania, which Communist China had been supporting politically and economically. A bitter exchange of polemics has ensued—an exchange that goes far beyond the issue of Albania.

Finally, Peking has made it clear that it does not regard the Soviet Party Program of the Twenty-Second Soviet Party Congress as binding on the Chinese Communists. The official Peking organ, *Red Flag*, (July 1, 1961), said:

In analysing a social problem, the absolute demand of Marxist theory is to place the problem within a definite historical limit. In addition, if a certain country (or, for example, the national programme of this country) is referred to, the concrete characteristics of this country that dis-

tinguish it from other countries in the same historical era must be taken into account.

This seemed to suggest that other Parties throughout the world might find the Chinese model rather than the Soviet more applicable to the "concrete characteristics" of their countries.

RICE-ROOTS ATTITUDES TOWARD RUSSIA

Stories of Chinese sensitivity over what may be termed Soviet high handedness have circulated freely in Hong Kong and elsewhere for years. There can be little doubt that the regime in Peking has been less than happy with Moscow on a great many scores, especially economic and atomic issues. The question of intense interest to which there is, of course, no firm answer is: what is the average Chinese attitude towards the Russians today?

Because in Red China the press is controlled and there are no Gallup polls, we must seek some hints to the answer by other means. One potentially fruitful source is the thousands of refugees from Mainland China in Hong Kong and Macao.

(Continued on page 246)

Rodger Swearingen is Associate Professor of International Relations and Director of the Research Institute on Communist Strategy and Propaganda, University of Southern California. He has his Ph.D. from Harvard University where he was associated with the Russian Research Center. He co-authored *Red Flag in Japan: International Communism in Action, 1919-1951* (Harvard University Press, 1952) and authored two books: *What's So Funny, Comrade?* (Praeger, 1961) and a new high school text *The World of Communism* (Houghton Mifflin, 1962). He has served as consultant with the State Department, The Rand Corporation, the Asia Foundation and the Ford Foundation. Dr. Swearingen, who has traveled extensively throughout the Soviet Union and East Europe recently returned from a trip to Hong Kong where he interviewed recent arrivals from Communist China. This article is an expanded version of a brief piece which appeared in the University of Southern California publication *Communist Affairs* Vol. I, No. 1, June, 1962.

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

The Fourteen-Nation Declaration and Protocol on Laos

On July 23, 1962, fourteen nations meeting in Geneva approved a declaration on the neutrality of Laos and a protocol clarifying the terms of their agreement. The complete texts of these statements and the Laotian statement of July 9 on its neutrality follow:

DECLARATION ON THE NEUTRALITY OF LAOS

The Governments of the Union of Burma, the Kingdom of Cambodia, Canada, the People's Republic of China, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of France, the Republic of India, the Polish People's Republic, the Republic of Vietnam, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, whose representatives took part in the international conference on the settlement of the Laotian question, 1961-1962:

Welcoming the presentation of the statement of neutrality by the Royal Government of Laos of July 9, 1962, and taking note of this statement, which is, with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos, incorporated in the present declaration as an integral part thereof, [See below for text]

Confirming the principles of respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos and non-interference in its internal affairs which are embodied in the Geneva agreements of 1954:

Emphasizing the principle of respect for the neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos:

Agreeing that the above-mentioned principles constitute a basis for the peaceful settlement of the Laotian question:

Profoundly convinced that the independence and neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos will assist the peaceful democratic develop-

ment of the Kingdom of Laos and the achievement of national accord and unity in that country, as well as the strengthening of peace and security in Southeast Asia:

1. Solemnly declare, in accordance with the will of the Government and people of the Kingdom of Laos, as expressed in the statement of neutrality by the Royal Government of Laos of July 9, 1962, that they recognize and will respect and observe in every way the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos.

2. Undertake, in particular, that

(A) They will not commit or participate in any way in any act which might directly or indirectly impair the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity or territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos:

(B) They will not resort to the use or threat of force or any other measure which might impair the peace of the Kingdom of Laos:

(C) They will refrain from all direct or indirect interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Laos:

(D) They will not attach conditions of a political nature to any assistance which they may offer or which the Kingdom of Laos may seek:

(E) They will not bring the Kingdom of Laos in any way into any military alliance or any other agreement, whether military or otherwise, which is inconsistent with her neutrality, nor invite or encourage her to enter

into any such alliance or to conclude any such agreement:

(F) They will respect the wish of the Kingdom of Laos not to recognize the protection of any military coalition or alliance including Seato:

(G) They will not introduce into the Kingdom of Laos foreign troops or military personnel in any form whatsoever, nor will they in any way facilitate or connive at the introduction of any foreign troops or military personnel:

(H) They will not establish nor will they in any way facilitate or connive at the establishment in the Kingdom of Laos of any foreign military base, foreign strong point or other foreign military installation of any kind:

(I) They will not use the territory of the Kingdom of Laos for interference in the internal affairs of other countries:

(J) They will not use the territory of another country, including their own, for interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Laos.

3. Appeal to all other states to recognize, respect and observe in every way the sovereignty, independence and neutrality, and also the unity and territorial integrity, of the Kingdom of Laos and to refrain from any action inconsistent with these principles or with other provisions of the present declaration.

4. Undertake, in the event of a violation or threat of violation of the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity or territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos, to consult jointly with the Royal Government of Laos and among themselves in order to consider measures which might prove to be necessary to insure the observance of these principles and the other provisions of the present declaration.

5. The present declaration shall enter into force on signature and together with the statement of neutrality by the Royal Government of Laos of July 9, 1962, shall be regarded as constituting an international agreement. The present declaration shall be deposited in the archives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall furnish certified copies thereof to the other signatory states and to all the other states of the world.

In witness whereof, the undersigned pleni-

potentiaries have signed the present declaration.

Done in two copies in Geneva this twenty-third day of July, 1962, in the English, Chinese, French, Laotian and Russian languages, each text being equally authoritative.

PROTOCOL

The Governments of the Union of Burma, the Kingdom of Cambodia, Canada, the People's Republic of China, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of France, the Republic of India, the Kingdom of Laos, the Polish People's Republic, the Republic of Vietnam, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America:

Having regard to the Declaration on the neutrality of Laos of July 23, 1962: have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

For the purposes of this protocol:

(A) The term "foreign military personnel" shall include members of foreign military missions, foreign military advisers, experts, instructors, consultants, technicians, observers and any other foreign military persons, including those serving in any armed forces in Laos, and foreign civilians connected with the supply, maintenance, storing and utilization of war materials:

(B) The term "the commission" shall mean the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos set up by virtue of the Geneva agreements of 1954 and composed of the representatives of Canada, India and Poland, with the representative of India as chairman:

(C) The term "the co-chairmen" shall mean the co-chairmen of the International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961-1962, and their successors in the offices of Her Britannic Majesty's principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, respectively:

(D) The term "the members of the conference" shall mean the Governments of countries which took part in the international conference for the settlement of the Laotian question, 1961-1962.

ARTICLE 2

All foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel shall be withdrawn from Laos in the shortest time possible and in any case the withdrawal shall be completed not later than 30 days after the commission has notified the Royal Government of Laos that in accordance with Articles 3 and 10 of this protocol its inspection teams are present at all points of withdrawal from Laos.

These points shall be determined by the Royal Government of Laos in accordance with Article 3 within 30 days after the entry into force of this protocol. The inspection teams shall be present at these points and the commission shall notify the Royal Government of Laos thereof within 15 days after the points have been determined.

ARTICLE 3

The withdrawal of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel shall take place only along such routes and through such points as shall be determined by the Royal Government of Laos in consultation with the commission. The commission shall be notified in advance of the point and time of all such withdrawals.

ARTICLE 4

The introduction of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel into Laos is prohibited.

ARTICLE 5

Note is taken that the French and Laotian Governments will conclude as soon as possible an arrangement to transfer the French military installations in Laos to the Royal Government of Laos.

If the Laotian Government considers it necessary, the French Government may as an exception leave in Laos for a limited period of time a precisely limited number of French military instructors for the purpose of training the armed forces of Laos.

The French and Laotian Governments shall inform the members of the conference, through the co-chairmen, of their agreement on the question of the transfer of the French

military installations in Laos and of the employment of French military instructors by the Laotian Government.

The introduction into Laos of armaments, munitions and war material generally, except such quantities of conventional armaments as the Royal Government of Laos may consider necessary for the national defense of Laos, is prohibited.

ARTICLE 7

All foreign military persons and civilians captured or interned during the course of hostilities in Laos shall be released within 30 days after the entry into force of this protocol and handed over by the Royal Government of Laos to the representatives of the Governments of the countries of which they are nationals in order that they may proceed to the destination of their choice.

ARTICLE 8

The co-chairmen shall periodically receive reports from the commission. In addition the commission shall immediately report to the co-chairmen any violations or threats of violations of this protocol, all significant steps which it takes in pursuance of this protocol, and also any other important information.

The commission may at any time seek help from the co-chairmen in the performance of its duties, and the co-chairmen may at any time make recommendations to the commission exercising general guidance.

The co-chairmen shall circulate the reports and any other important information from the commission to the members of the conference.

The co-chairmen shall exercise supervision over the observance of this protocol and the declaration on the neutrality of Laos.

The co-chairmen will keep the members of the conference constantly informed and when appropriate will consult with them.

ARTICLE 9

The commission shall, with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos, supervise and control the cease-fire in Laos.

The commission shall exercise these functions in full cooperation with the Royal Government of Laos and within the framework of the cease-fire agreement or cease-fire arrangements made by the three political forces

in Laos, or the Royal Government of Laos. It is understood that responsibility for the execution of the cease-fire shall rest with the three parties concerned and with the Royal Government of Laos after its formation.

ARTICLE 10

The commission shall supervise and control the withdrawal of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military formations and foreign military personnel. Inspection teams sent by the commission for these purposes shall be present for the period of the withdrawal at all points of withdrawal from Laos determined by the Royal Government of Laos in consultation with the commission in accordance with Article 3 of this protocol.

ARTICLE 11

The commission shall investigate cases where there are reasonable grounds for considering that a violation of the provisions of Article 4 of this protocol has occurred.

It is understood that in the exercise of this function the commission is acting with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos. It shall carry out its investigations in full cooperation with the Royal Government of Laos and shall immediately inform the co-chairmen of any violations or threats of violations of Article 4, and also of all significant steps which it takes in pursuance of this article in accordance with Article 8.

ARTICLE 12

The commission shall assist the Royal Government of Laos in cases where the Royal Government of Laos considers that a violation of Article 6 of this protocol may have taken place. This assistance will be rendered at the request of the Royal Government of Laos and in full cooperation with it.

ARTICLE 13

The commission shall exercise its functions under this protocol in close cooperation with the Royal Government of Laos. It is understood that the Royal Government of Laos at all levels will render the commission all possible assistance in the performance by the commission of these functions and also will take all necessary measures to insure the security of the commission and its inspection teams during their activities in Laos.

ARTICLE 14

The commission functions as a single organ of the International Conference for the Settlement of the Laotian Question, 1961-1962.

The members of the commission will work harmoniously and in cooperation with each other with the aim of solving all questions within the terms of reference of the commission.

Decisions of the commission on questions relating to violations of Articles 2, 3, 4, and 6 of this protocol or of the cease-fire referred to in Article 9, conclusions on major questions sent to the co-chairmen and all recommendations by the commission shall be adopted unanimously. On other questions, including procedural questions, and also questions relating to the initiation and carrying out of investigations (Article 15), decisions of the commission shall be adopted by majority vote.

ARTICLE 15

In the exercise of its specific functions which are laid down in the relevant articles of this protocol the commission shall conduct investigations [directly or by sending inspection teams], when there are reasonable grounds for considering that a violation has occurred. These investigations shall be carried out at the request of the Royal Government of Laos or on the initiative of the commission, which is acting with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos.

In the latter case decisions on initiating and carrying out such investigations shall be taken in the commission by majority votes.

The commission shall submit agreed reports on investigations in which differences which may emerge between members of the commission on particular questions may be expressed.

The conclusions and recommendations of the commission resulting from investigations shall be adopted unanimously.

ARTICLE 16

For the exercise of its functions the commission shall, as necessary, set up inspection teams, on which the three member-states of the commission shall be equally represented. Each member-state of the commission shall insure the presence of its own representatives both on the commission and on the inspection teams, and shall promptly replace them in

the event of their being unable to perform their duties. It is understood that the dispatch of inspection teams to carry out various specific tasks takes place with the concurrence of the Royal Government of Laos. The points to which the commission and its inspection teams go for the purposes of investigation and their length of stay at those points shall be determined in relation to the requirements of the particular investigation.

ARTICLE 17

The commission shall have at its disposal the means of communication and transport required for the performance of its duties. These as a rule will be provided to the commission by the Royal Government of Laos for payment on mutually acceptable terms, and those which the Royal Government of Laos cannot provide will be acquired by the commission from other sources. It is understood that the means of communication and transport will be under the administrative control of the commission.

ARTICLE 18

The costs of the operations of the commission shall be borne by the members of the conference in accordance with the provisions of this article.

(A) The Governments of Canada, India and Poland shall pay the personal salaries and allowances of their nationals who are members of their delegations to the commission and its subsidiary organs.

(B) The primary responsibility for the provision of accommodation for the commission and its subsidiary organs shall rest with the Royal Government of Laos, which shall also provide such of the local services as may be appropriate. The commission shall charge to the fund referred to in sub-paragraph (C) below any local expenses not borne by the Royal Government of Laos.

(C) All other capital or running expenses incurred by the commission in the exercise of its functions shall be met from a fund to which all the members of the conference shall contribute in the following proportions.

The Governments of the People's Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America shall contribute 17.6 per cent each.

The Governments of Burma, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Laos, the Republic of Vietnam and Thailand shall contribute 1.5 per cent each.

The Governments of Canada, India and Poland as members of the commission shall contribute 1 per cent each.

ARTICLE 19

The co-chairmen shall at any time, if the Royal Government of Laos so requests, and in any case not later than three years after the entry into force of this protocol, present a report with appropriate recommendations on the question of the termination of the commission to the members of the conference for their consideration. Before making such a report the co-chairmen shall hold consultations with the Royal Government of Laos and the commission.

ARTICLE 20

This protocol shall enter into force on signature.

It shall be deposited in the archives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall furnish certified copies thereof to the other signatory states and to all other states of the world.

In witness whereof, the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed this protocol.

Done in two copies in Geneva this 23rd day of July, 1962, in the English, Chinese, French, Laotian and Russian languages, each text being equally authoritative.

LAOTIAN STATEMENT OF NEUTRALITY, JULY 9, 1962

The Royal Government of Laos, resolved to follow the path of peace and neutrality in conformity with the interests and aspirations of the Laotian people, as well as the principles of the joint communiqué of Zurich dated June 22, 1961, and the Geneva agreements of 1954, in order to build a peaceful, neutral, independent democratic, unified and prosperous Laos, solemnly declare that:

1. It will resolutely apply the five principles of peaceful coexistence in foreign relations, and will establish friendly relations and develop diplomatic relations with all countries, the neighboring countries first and foremost, on the basis of equality and of respect for the

independence and sovereignty of Laos.

2. It is the will of the Laotian people to preserve and secure respect for the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity and territorial integrity of Laos.

3. It will not resort to the use or threat of force in any way which might impair the peace of other countries, and will not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.

4. It will not enter into any military alliance or into any agreement, whether military or otherwise, which is inconsistent with the neutrality of the kingdom of Laos. It will not allow the establishment of any foreign military base on Laotian territory, nor allow any country to use Laotian territory for military purposes or for the purposes of interference in the internal affairs of other countries, nor recognize the protection of any alliance or military coalition (including Seato).¹

5. It will not allow any foreign interference in the internal affairs of the kingdom of Laos in any form whatsoever.

6. Subject to the provisions of Article 5 of

¹ Seato will be referred to by the words "including Seato" if the members of that organization do not officially withdraw at their earliest convenience the protection that it has extended to Laos.

the protocol, it will require the withdrawal from Laos of all foreign troops and military personnel and will not allow any foreign troops or military personnel to be introduced into Laos.

7. It will accept direct and unconditional aid from all countries that wish to help the kingdom of Laos build up an independent and autonomous national economy on the basis of respect for the sovereignty of Laos.

8. It will respect the treaties and agreements signed in conformity with the interests of the Laotian people and of the policy of peace and neutrality of the kingdom, in particular the Geneva agreements of 1962, and will abrogate all treaties and agreements which are contrary to those principles.

This statement by the Royal Government of Laos on neutrality shall be promulgated constitutionally and shall have the force of law.

The kingdom of Laos appeals to all the states participating in the international conference on the settlement of the Laotian question, and to all other states, to recognize the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity and territorial integrity of Laos, to conform to these principles in all respects and to refrain from any action inconsistent therewith.

Russia Plans to Continue Nuclear Testing

On July 21, 1962, the Soviet Press Agency Tass revealed that the U.S.S.R. plans to resume the testing of nuclear weapons. The complete text of the announcement follows:

For many years, the Soviet Union has been pressing for the ending of nuclear weapon tests for all time. But the United States, together with its Nato allies, is sabotaging agreement on this question. This was again made clear to the entire world when the United States and Britain in effect refused in the 18 nation disarmament committee to accept as the basis for the talks—as the Soviet Union had done—the proposal of India, the United Arab Republic, Brazil and other uncommitted states in the committee, providing for control over the test-ban agreement with the help of

the national means of detection.

The Western powers want one thing—to establish a network of international control posts on the territory of the Soviet Union and to have inspections which are not necessary for the verification of compliance with the agreement but which are highly desirable to Nato's intelligence services and military staffs working on the plans of a war of aggression against peace-loving states.

Over the past months, one nuclear weapon test after another has been held by the United States of America in the Pacific and in North

America—in the state of Nevada. This series of nuclear weapon tests has far surpassed all the previous ones. Recently, despite widespread protests, including protests by scientists, the United States exploded a nuclear device of a great yield at an altitude of several hundred kilometers, extending to outer space the arms race which is hateful to the peoples.

Even before it embarked on its present series of nuclear tests, the Government of the United States was well aware that if American nuclear bombs were to start exploding, the Soviet Union would be faced with the need to hold tests of its nuclear weapons. The Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, N. S. Khrushchev, openly warned the President of the United States, J. Kennedy, of this in his message of March 3, 1962. Consequently, the Government of the United States was fully aware of what it was doing.

On it, and on it alone, depended whether the tests to which the Soviet Union had had to resort in the fall of 1961 would be the last or whether our planet would be swept by a new wave of nuclear tests. And the Government of the United States made its choice. The explosions of American nuclear bombs above Christmas and Johnston Islands have produced their echo—they have made reply-nuclear tests by the Soviet Union inevitable.

The Government of the United States does not hide that it has undertaken this new series of nuclear weapon tests, and especially tests in outer space, to try to achieve a military supremacy over the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union would not justify the trust of the Soviet people and would not display concern for the future of the Soviet state, if it did not draw appropriate conclusions. No, the Soviet Union will not give this satisfaction to those who harbor aggressive designs against our country, who threaten us and our allies with preventive war.

The Soviet people have not forgotten and will never forget the perfidious attack by Nazi Germany on our country. They know from the experience of 1941 how vitally important it is for our defenses to be abreast

of the latest achievements of science and military technology so as to be able to meet the aggressor fully prepared at any moment.

In reply to the series of nuclear tests by the United States, the Soviet Government has ordered tests to be held of the newest types of Soviet nuclear weapons. This is a forced step on the part of the Soviet Union.

When these tests are held, all measures will be taken to reduce radioactive fall-out to the minimum. The Soviet Union has achieved considerable results in this respect. It is widely acknowledged that the Soviet tests last fall were not accompanied by any essential increase in radioactivity in the atmosphere, on land, or in the ocean.

Anyone who cherishes a sense of justice, any unbiased person cannot but agree that since the United States was the first to start nuclear weapon tests and has held many more of them, with its allies, than has the Soviet Union, the other side, the Soviet Union, which has invariably held its nuclear tests only in reply, has the right to be the last to hold nuclear tests in the world.

The Soviet Government calls upon the Governments of the United States and the other Western powers to heed the demands of the peoples and remove the artificial barriers to agreement on the ending of nuclear weapon tests, which would be based on the achievements of science which enable control over strict compliance with this agreement to be effected by the national means of detection.

The Soviet Government subscribes to the appeal which the World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace addressed to the peoples of all countries—to strengthen peace, to fight for disarmament, to deliver mankind from the threat of nuclear annihilation. This appeal embodies the will of the peoples, and this will is the supreme law of history.

The struggle for the ending of nuclear tests, for disarmament, for peace, continues and it must be crowned with victory for the cause of peace.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE SIEGE OF LENINGRAD. By LEON GOURÉ. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962. 363 pages, bibliography and index, \$6.95.)

During the Nazi invasion of Russia in 1941, the city of Leningrad—the second largest in the U.S.S.R.—was besieged by the Germans for almost two and a half years. The city and its courageous populace withstood cold, hunger, suffering—not to say the continued onslaughts of the German army—and played a key role in thwarting Hitler's attempt to conquer Russia.

Leon Gouré, relying upon German and Soviet accounts and data, has reconstructed the facts and flavor of a city under siege. The facts he has marshalled are impressive, but the flavor may seem hard to take. For this reader, at least, Gouré's account seems to minimize the role that patriotism played in maintaining the resistance of the civil population. Gouré states that the population obeyed and submitted to harsh command of the military and Party because they had no visible alternative: the city's geographic location made escape difficult (one wonders whether such would not be true of any city under siege); "an ingrained habit of obedience to the authorities" led the Leningraders to do as they were told; "the Stalinist terror system" created an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion among the populace so that none dared voice his criticism of the authorities to his neighbor; finally, he says that the populace "did not think it advisable or desirable to risk their own chances of 'liberation' by actively assisting the Germans in the conquest of the city."

The author does acknowledge that the will to survive, the centralized and tight official control, and such "various attitudes

... as patriotism, local pride, growing resentment of the Germans, reluctance to betray the soldiers defending the city (many of whom were themselves from Leningrad), and unwillingness to see so much suffering serve no purpose," all fostered by Soviet propaganda, served to keep the besieged fighting. The narrative is detailed and informative, but it is an amazingly bloodless account for so dramatic an episode in history.

A.Z.R.

SOVIET POTENTIALS: A GEOGRAPHIC APPRAISAL. By GEORGE B. CRESSEY. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1962. 232 pages, selected readings and index, \$5.75.)

Premier Khrushchev has stated that, within a generation, the Soviet economy will overtake and surpass that of the United States. The author of this extensive survey of Soviet resources and limitations poses the question: "Does the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have the environmental potentials with which to become the world's greatest state?"

He introduces the reader to a brief but fact-crammed, balanced presentation of the landscape of the U.S.S.R., the diverse population and the climatic conditions. There are informative chapters on the land and the critical problem of agriculture, and the author shows how the leaders are striving to overcome an unfavorable combination of climate, rainfall, and soil fertility. Sections are devoted to the various regions of the Soviet Union, with expert commentaries on the potential and resources of each region. Professor Cressey notes that "climate is one of Russia's great handicaps, for winters are so long and severe that little outdoor activity is pos-

sible." The soils are good—adequate to feed the population—but "offer no great promise for the future." In mineral wealth, the Soviet Union is rich and "is more nearly self-sufficient in its mineral wealth than any other nation."

He concludes with the following appraisal: "Certain basic geographic factors will continue to influence Russian policy. These include the desire for internal resource development, additional food supply, free access to the high seas, enlarged foreign trade, and the achievement of security. While Soviet potentials are impressive, the environmental limitations are important. Irrespective of her form of government, it does not seem likely that the land of the Soviets can overtake Western Europe or North America in overall material strength and per capita welfare."

A.Z.R.

THE WORLD OF COMMUNISM. By RODGER SWEARINGEN. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962. 278 pages, appendix, selected readings, index, \$2.32.) (available in paperback, \$1.32.)

In recent years an impressive number of excellent studies have appeared on communism, the Soviet system, and the Soviet bloc. Most of these, however, have been designed for the specialist or for university-level students. No one has taken the time, thought, and patience to write informatively and interestingly for the high school student who may desire to know more about the operations and policies of international communism.

Professor Swearingen of the University of Southern California has undertaken to answer the 100 questions most often asked by American high school students about communism. In nine chapters, he has compiled a vast amount of information, organized the material well, and written in a manner that should surely meet the demands of the interested high school student who wants an introduction to the world of communism. In addition to chapters on ideology, the world Commu-

nist movement, the Soviet political and economic system and the life of the average Soviet citizen, the author has cast his net far and wide and has included excellent sections on China, Communism in the United States, and Russia and China in world affairs. There is much in this volume that should attract the attention of high school social studies' teachers.

A.Z.R.

REVISIONISM: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF MARXIST IDEAS. EDITED BY LEOPOLD LABEDZ. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. 404 pages, index, \$7.95.)

Growing fissures in the Communist bloc reflect conflicting national interests, political objectives, and interpretations of the meaning of Marxism-Leninism, as applied to contemporary conditions. The present collection of essays addresses itself to the latter problem, to revisionism, its evolution and meaning for intra-Communist bloc relationships. Each Communist leader considers himself the guardian and interpreter of the ideas and intended interpretations of Marx and Lenin; those who deviate are regarded as heretics. As the editor of this collection remarks in his introduction, "Revisionism is to Marxist movements what heresy is to religious ones.

... Whether the revisions are concerned with the ends or the means, with the rationality of purpose or the technology of power, whether their inspiration is humanist or autocratic, in all cases they must lead to important changes not only in the theoretical assumptions of the original Marxian *Weltanschauung*, but in its historical and philosophical perspective, as well."

The revisionist "debate" is traced through the writings of its principals: Eduard Bernstein, George Plekhanov, Rosa Luxemburg, Leon Trotsky, Nikolai Bukharin, N. M. Roy, and so on. One notable absence is an essay dealing with the Chinese position in this ideological construction of "creative Marxism," a shortcoming that should be corrected in the next edi-

tion. But certainly the volume is worthy of attention by all serious students. The questions raised and treated are of fundamental importance to policy-makers, as well as students: e.g., do the changes "occurring in the Communist world point to some sort of 'normalization' accompanied by a reduced role for ideology, even if only tacit and despite official assertions to the contrary? Is the 'end of ideology' (not to be confused with an increasingly sophisticated approach to its interpretation and application) in sight?" The essays in this volume deal perceptively and challengingly with such questions.

A.Z.R.

THE SOVIET UNION TODAY: A CONCISE HANDBOOK. BY KENNETH R. WHITING. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. 405 pages, bibliography and index. \$7.50.) (also available in paperback.)

The author states that "this book, unlike many of its more scholarly brethren, breaks no new ground, advances no unique point of view, and does not attempt to treat any one subject exhaustively. It is, as its title states, a handbook. It is intended for the person seeking an introduction to things Soviet, for the busy citizen who wants a brief exposition of what makes the Soviet Union tick." In accomplishing his objective, Mr. Whiting has made available a rich, variegated, compact package which should find a wide audience. In 14 chapters, he deals competently and interestingly with vital topics: a history of Russia; communist ideology; the organization and operation of the government and the Party; the problems of agriculture; the development of industry; the educational system; the armed forces; and two sections devoted to foreign policy.

This clear, concise, informative presentation should prove of invaluable assistance in an introductory course on the Soviet system.

A.Z.R.

THE COMMUNIST BLUEPRINT FOR THE FUTURE. INTRODUCTION BY THOMAS P. WHITNEY. (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1962. 240 pages, index, \$3.95.)
RUSSIA ENTERS THE 1960's. EDITED BY HARRY SCHWARTZ. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1962. 278 pages, \$6.50.)

The Twenty-second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was held in October, 1961. Premier Khrushchev used the occasion to present a new Party Program, the first formal Party Program issued since 1919, and to outline the latest Soviet blueprint for the attainment of communism. The new Party Program and related documents have been compiled, with introductions, by noted specialists on Soviet affairs, for a number of publishers. Thomas P. Whitney, formerly Associated Press correspondent in Moscow, has written an informative essay by way of introducing not only the new Party Program, but four other important Communist documents: the Manifesto of the Communist Party (1848); Critique of the Gotha Program (1875); The Program of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party (1903); The Program of the All-Russian Communist Party (1919). Their ready availability in one volume will be welcomed by student and instructor alike.

Thomas Whitney offers a number of observations on the new Party Program: the Program "represents a major effort by the Soviet Communist Party to keep the Soviet Union in its position as leader of international communism. In this respect it represents a carefully prepared attack on the Chinese Communists"; the Program is geared to make a deep impression upon the underdeveloped countries; and it is an indication of the direction in which the Soviet leaders propose to orient their efforts in the task of making Soviet society just as affluent in the future as the United States and Western Europe are at present.

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COEXISTENCE IN WEST EUROPE

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ness and even eagerness to meet the West on this kind of battleground are, as we have seen, clear and unmistakable.

One might add to this the fact that the reality of Soviet fears of a continued uncontrolled arms race is revealed in a number of other aspects of their recent policies. The repeated reluctance of the Soviets to aid China in nuclear weapons development and Khrushchev's recent offer to the West of a treaty to prevent further diffusion of nuclear capability make it evident that the U.S.S.R. is willing to go far towards incurring the displeasure of its powerful ally to secure some measure of arms control.

Moreover, Richard Barnett has revealed that there has been in the last few years an intensive campaign in the Soviet Union "to reconcile the possibility of disarmament with Marxist ideology." The indications are that "Khrushchev is determined to develop within the Soviet Union an ideological position that can encompass negotiated disarmament."¹³

There is, in addition, evidence that comprehensive plans for development and the reallocation of economic resources are being drawn up by the managers of economic enterprises in the U.S.S.R., to be put into effect in case of disarmament.¹⁴ Certainly the presumption is that a disarmament treaty is at least being considered as a serious possibility. The recent unilateral Soviet ending of the test ban moratorium has been viewed as proof of Soviet unwillingness to take disarmament seriously. All that it probably does prove is that no question of disarmament can be settled when one side believes that it is significantly behind the other.

One might also argue (and some have) that if armaments are becoming an intolerable drain on Soviet resources and a brake on her economic progress, it is in our interest to increase this pressure rather than to remove it. Unfortunately, the nature of a modern nuclear arms race is such that the longer the race goes on the more remote becomes the

possibility of ever ending it other than through mutual annihilation.

It seems reasonable, then, that a key to the nature of the underlying Soviet challenge should be sought in the areas of economic rivalry rather than in the area of world conquest and military annihilation. If this is true, the possibility of achieving a general negotiated settlement contributing to the security of both sides and enforced by mutual interest is much more firmly rooted in reality than is the esoteric and sterile numbers game of the "delicate balance of terror." In the end, victory will belong not to the impossible winner of an arms race, but to that society which can produce in greater abundance and distribute the fruits of its production with greater equity.

In this struggle the West can win if it puts aside its age-old rivalries, drops its tariff barriers, submits to common economic planning, and links its individual fates to a common goal more positive than the simple avoidance of nuclear annihilation. In such a struggle the West has superior assets and a tremendous lead which it does not have now nor ever can hope to possess in the arms race. After all, for the Soviets, "catching up with the United States in production" is still the Holy Grail shimmering in the far distance.

¹³ Barnett, Richard J., "The Soviet Attitude on Disarmament," in LeFever, Ernest W., *Arms & Arms Control*, Praeger: New York, 1962, pp. 103-104.

¹⁴ Scott, John, *ibid.*, p. 35.

UNCOMMITTED NATIONS

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policy, the socialist countries would certainly be willing to grant them credit and loans on worthwhile terms."

The establishment of a Communist state in Cuba has given Moscow a foothold in the Western hemisphere. On the crest of Castro's attempt to export his revolution, Moscow hopes to develop strong Communist movements in other Latin American countries. The abortive American-supported effort to overthrow Castro in April, 1961, has given

Moscow a convenient cudgel with which to flail American power and influence. By intensifying deep-rooted feelings of anti-Americanism, identifying itself with revolutionary movements, and promising substantial assistance, Moscow expects to use Fidel Castro to expand the Communist influence in America's backyard.

HOSTILITY TO MOSCOW?

The post-Stalinist rise in Soviet prestige and influence among the uncommitted countries stemmed only in part from the entry of Moscow into the field of foreign economic aid; it developed more directly as a consequence of Western diplomatic ineptness in dealing with the neutralists, and of shrewd Soviet support at a time when astute combinations of diplomatic, military, as well as economic, support bore yields disproportionate to their material worth. As it becomes more intimately involved with these countries, and seeks to translate good-will into political influence, Moscow will encounter, as it already has in a number of countries, increasing wariness and opposition to Communist interference.

CHALLENGE FOR THE WEST

For the West, the challenge will grow in intensity during the coming decade: economically, continued and considerable outlays of foreign aid will be required; politically, dictators and authoritarian regimes will often have to be supported; militarily, American troops fighting in far-flung areas of the world must be accepted as part of the burden; psychologically, perhaps the most trying aspect of the challenge, the United States must learn to live with the ever present threat of war, must thrust itself into affairs which seem far removed from the demands of American national security, and must commit itself to the promotion of nationalism in underdeveloped countries even though these countries may irritate and antagonize the West by statements and actions. But at this stage of development in the underdeveloped nations of the world, nationalism is the principal foe of communism.

SOVIET IDEOLOGY

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real and inevitable mechanism of transition from stage to stage, whereas "bourgeois" political scientists, economists, historians and sociologists present only mental constructs on the foundation of the rotten capitalist economy. No contradiction will ever be heard in class. Repeated hundreds of times, the doctrine will be internalized by most Soviet adolescents and young persons. This certainly is a great asset to those in power.

The incredulous perhaps will ask this question: how is it possible that Soviet youth will accept the infallibility of Marxism-Leninism, although the predicted collapse of the capitalist order of production was formulated by Marx more than 100 years ago and repeated by Lenin some 50 years ago, but has not yet materialized? It is possible that some bright youths will see the absurdity of predicting the inevitable and almost immediate fulfillment of their dream for a whole century; but they hardly will express their doubts openly. So doing, they would display "bourgeois mentality," which might affect their careers. Most foreign observers report the widely spread absence of critical spirit in the younger generation, and talks with young people coming to this country for study or other legitimate purposes confirm that impression.

Still the Moscow rulers have not created a perfect mechanism of indoctrination. The majority of Soviet people are obviously not preoccupied with high level problems. Their minds are not prepared to accept any "foreign ideology." Of course, exceptions exist. Nobody knows how many persons still preserve "the religious prejudices" of the past. There are many older people who cling to these prejudices even after a period of very superficial acceptance of the official doctrine. As Soviet papers often report with horror and disgust, religious belief and the practice of religion are by no means rare in young persons, while others adhere to a very simple ideology: take from life everything you can

without exposing yourselves to the severe penalties of Soviet law.

Of course, there are also persons who sincerely accept the official creed (of which the Party program is merely a new exposition). How many they are, nobody knows. They cannot be numerous since the Soviet press continues to complain that it is difficult to find a sufficient number of persons able and willing to indoctrinate the ignorant and apathetic masses and produce a large crop of "new men," thinking, feeling and acting in accordance with official doctrine. It would be especially interesting to know how many real Communists one would find on the top level of the Party since no member of that élite would under any circumstances confess that "he is not a Marxist," as Karl Marx confessed in a letter written to a Russian Socialist.

THE RUSSO-CHINESE ALLIANCE

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In Hong Kong this past summer, I talked to a number of these recent arrivals. The pattern of their answers to a series of basic questions on the Soviet government, Russian advisors in China and China's economic plight was surprising. It should be noted by way of background that the composite picture of economic difficulties painted by these refugees confirms other evidence of severe food shortages and a general economic breakdown in Mainland China.

The rice-roots case against Russia may be put very simply: Too many phoney promises. One recent refugee, financial secretary of a large commune, revealed that his friends regularly made comments to the effect that they saw no Russian goods in the Commune stores or even in Canton, but that "they had heard that the fattest Chinese pigs were being sent off to Russia." This theme was repeated in many versions. In short, the Russians are being held responsible, at least in part, for China's current economic crisis. The Chinese Communist party leaders appear to be encouraging this kind of feeling since it suggests that hypocrisy in Moscow rather than inadequacy in Peking is the root of the problem. This theme, combined as it is with the unfavorable image of the "arrogant and fat"

Soviet advisor, makes the Russians, ironically, the current "foreign devils" in China—more like "capitalists" than Comrades! Yet few of the refugees appear to feel that Communist China is on the brink of revolution. "The controls are too strong; the people too weak," one young former commune cadre member replied.

To keep the picture in perspective, it should be added immediately that in the military and strategic industry fields, Communist China is very much dependent on the Soviet Union. Thus, whatever dissatisfaction exists vis-a-vis Moscow must be balanced by the realities of the power struggle. The Chinese have shown themselves over the years to be practical realists capable of adjusting to the situation. In sum, at the moment Communist China needs the Soviet Union more than the Soviet Union needs China. Indeed, at least from an economic point of view, one can scarcely imagine a greater liability than 700 million hungry Chinese, although the Soviets of course, find it handy to have an Asian "ally" to challenge the "imperialists" in Asia.

What may we conclude? Certainly not that Communist China is any less a threat to the Free World than the Soviet Union. The point is quite different. The Peking leaders are both Communist and Chinese. It is this explosive blend of traditional pride, sensitivity, anti-foreignism, dialectical materialism, urgency, Leninism, immaturity and zeal that causes concern. In this sense, Communist China could well prove a more aggressive, unpredictable and dangerous foe than the Soviet Union.

BOOK REVIEWS

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The volume edited by Harry Schwartz presents the speeches delivered at the Twenty-second Congress by key Soviet leaders, in addition to the new Party Program. Brief biographical sketches introduce the speech of each official. This volume will be of interest to anyone interested in the detailed presentations delivered at the Twenty-second Party Congress. The absence of an index is regrettable.

A.Z.R.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of August, 1962, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Arab League, The

- Aug. 27—Syria asks the Arab League Council to adopt a resolution condemning the United Arab Republic for alleged interference in Syrian internal affairs.
- Aug. 28—The U.A.R. walks out of a Council meeting and threatens to quit the League.
- Aug. 29—The U.A.R. delegation returns to the Council meetings.
- Aug. 31—The Arab League Council votes to end discussion of Syrian charges against the U.A.R.

Berlin Crisis

- Aug. 13—Marking the anniversary of the erection of the Berlin wall, West Berliners engage in a massive stone and bottle throwing melee. Communist guards reply with tear-gas grenades.
- Aug. 17—East German border guards shoot a young man escaping to West Berlin and let him lie dying for an hour at the wall's edge.
- Aug. 20—Scores are injured as West Berliners, protesting against both Soviet actions and Allied inaction in Berlin, battle West Berlin police.
- Aug. 21—The Western Allies announce they will attempt to send ambulances into East Berlin to give medical aid to any refugee wounded by East German guards.
- Aug. 22—The U.S.S.R. abolishes the office of Soviet commandant of troops in East Berlin. His duties are transferred to the commander of Soviet troops in East Germany, whose headquarters are at Potsdam.
- Aug. 23—East Germany appoints one of its generals as commandant of East Berlin.

The Western Allies assert that the U.S.S.R. has no power to shed its responsibilities as an occupying power.

- Aug. 24—The Soviet Union officially protests to the U.S. on the stoning of Soviet troops by West Berliners.
- Aug. 27—Answering Soviet charges, the U.S. says the U.S.S.R. is responsible for Berlin tension and for the third time within a week urges the Soviet Union to join in talks aimed at reducing incidents.
- Aug. 29—At his news conference, U.S. President Kennedy declares that a meeting of the four Western foreign ministers on Berlin has been agreed on "in principle."
- Aug. 31—Informed sources report that plans for a foreign ministers conference on Berlin have been abandoned.

Disarmament

- Aug. 5—The U.S. delegate at the 17-nation disarmament conference, Arthur Dean, outlines new proposals to break the nuclear test ban impasse. The U.S. is prepared to cut the number of world-wide monitoring stations from 180 to 80 but insists that Moscow must agree to on-site inspection.
- Aug. 9—At Geneva the Soviet delegate, Valerian Zorin, categorically rejects the new U.S. compromise proposals for a treaty to end nuclear testing.
- Aug. 10—Arthur Dean outlines the U.S. plan for progressive inspection by zones to verify compliance with disarmament pledges. Zorin terms the proposal "unacceptable."
- Aug. 22—The Geneva disarmament conference votes to recess from September 8 to November 12 to allow the United Nations to find a way to break the 5-month deadlock.

Aug. 27—Britain and the U.S. propose a limited unpoliced ban on nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in space and under water; underground testing would not be included.

Aug. 28—The Soviet Union tentatively rejects the latest Western nuclear test proposal.

Aug. 29—The Soviet Union proposes that nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in space and under water be banned and that a moratorium without inspection be placed on underground tests. These two prohibitions would become effective January 1, 1963.

European Economic Community (Common Market)

Aug. 5—Negotiations between Britain and the Common Market break down on the issue of Commonwealth relations with the European association. The discussions are scheduled to resume in October.

Aug. 24—An accord reached at Brussels provides that on November 1 Greece will become an associate member of the Common Market.

Organization of American States

Aug. 10—The Council of the O.A.S. votes against an immediate foreign ministers' conference to consider the threat to the Western Hemisphere of anti-democratic coups d'état.

United Nations

(See also *Congo, Republic of the* and *Indonesia*.)

Aug. 22—Acting Secretary General U Thant presents a 1963 budget calling for \$86.7 million, an increase of \$4.5 million over the 1962 budget. He warns that the financial condition of the U.N. is "a matter of grave concern."

Aug. 27—U Thant visits the Soviet Union to talk with Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Premier Nikita Khrushchev.

World Youth Festival

Aug. 4—At Helsinki, Finland, Ceylonese,

Ugandan and Palestinian Arab delegates leave the Communist-sponsored festival after charging they have been "systematically exploited" by organizers of the meeting.

Aug. 6—The Youth Festival ends after officials suppress an anti-nuclear demonstration protesting atomic testing by both East and West.

ALGERIA

Aug. 2—Leaders of the rival Nationalist faction and the Provisional Government compromise their major differences. It is agreed that Vice Premier Mohammed Ben Bella's Political Bureau will supplant the Provisional Government until elections are held.

Aug. 5—Mohammed Khider, a leading member of the Nationalist group, is named Secretary General of the 7-man Political Bureau.

Aug. 7—The Provisional Government of Premier Ben Khedda formally divests itself of its powers in favor of the Political Bureau.

Aug. 20—The National Liberation Front publishes its list of candidates for the September 2 elections. More than one-third of the candidates are military officers. A Communist request that their candidates be listed with those of the National Liberation Front is rejected.

Aug. 23—Ben Bella appeals to the people against local army commanders who are resisting the authority of the Political Bureau. Algiers is under the control of the Fourth Willaya (military zone) with 20,000 troops, and the Kabylie Mountains to the east are held by 10,000 troops of the Third Willaya.

Aug. 25—The Political Bureau says it is "no longer in a position to fulfill fully" its responsibilities because of the opposition of local military leaders; thus it postpones indefinitely the elections for the Constituent Assembly. Mohammed Boudiaf, a Ben Bella opponent, resigns from the Political Bureau because of the election postponement.

Aug. 28—The head of the regular army publicly gives the support of his 45,000 troops to the Political Bureau; and 4 of the 6 Willaya commanders with a total of 30,000 troops also give their support.

France and Algeria sign agreements on French aid, including joint exploration of minerals in the Sahara.

Aug. 29—In the Casbah section of Algiers fighting resumes between Fourth Willaya troops and followers loyal to Ben Bella and the governing Political Bureau.

Aug. 31—Algerians demonstrate in the streets of Algiers for an end to civil war.

ARGENTINA

Aug. 1—As a 48-hour general strike against the government begins, rioting erupts in Buenos Aires.

Aug. 8—Major General Toranzo Montero sets up a rebel command post in the north; 4 generals rally to his support in demanding that General Bautista Loza resign as Secretary of War. General Loza resigns.

Aug. 10—As rival military forces gather in Buenos Aires, President José Guido swears in Lieutenant General Eduardo Senorans as Secretary of War. The appointment is declared unacceptable to General Montero, who declares himself commander-in-chief of the Army.

Aug. 11—Guido and rebellious army leaders agree on General Cornejo Saravia as the new Secretary of the Army.

BRAZIL

Aug. 10—Premier Brochado da Rocha asks Congress to delegate sweeping political and economic powers to the Cabinet.

Aug. 11—The Inter-American Development Bank approves a \$15-million loan for the expansion of electric power in the north-eastern area of Brazil.

Aug. 14—As Congress debates emergency powers for the Cabinet, President João Goulart suggests a national plebiscite on whether to keep the 11-month-old parliamentary system or to revert to a full presidential regime.

Aug. 18—The President and the Premier

reach agreement with hostile congressional leaders to postpone a decision on a plebiscite until the new congressional session in mid-September.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, THE

Canada

Aug. 2—The Saskatchewan Parliament completes passage of amendments to medical-care legislation, permitting doctors to practice independently of the plan if they wish.

Aug. 9—Prime Minister John Diefenbaker makes major changes in his cabinet, including the transfer of Donald M. Fleming from Finance Minister to Minister of Justice.

Ghana

Aug. 1—A bomb is thrown near the car of President Kwame Nkrumah; he is uninjured but 4 persons are killed and 56 are injured.

Aug. 13—The Right Rev. Richard Roseveare, Anglican Bishop of Accra, is ordered to leave the country immediately. The Bishop has been bitterly criticized by the Ghanaian press for calling the Young Pioneers godless. Also expelled is the Most Reverend Cecil Patterson, Anglican Archbishop of West Africa, who supported Roseveare.

Aug. 29—Foreign Minister Ado Adjei, Information and Broadcasting Minister Tawia Adamfio, and the ruling Convention People's party Executive Secretary H. Cofie-Crabbe are jailed by President Kwame Nkrumah for state security reasons.

Aug. 30—Nkrumah names Nathaniel A. Welbeck as executive secretary of the C.P.P.

Great Britain

Aug. 2—Britain refuses to grant political asylum to Dr. Robert Soblen and orders El Al, the Israeli airline, to return him to the U.S., where he faces a life sentence for wartime espionage.

Aug. 3—El Al refuses to fly Soblen to New York.

Aug. 7—The government orders the deportation of George Lincoln Rockwell, the U.S.

Nazi party leader who has been attending a meeting of British Fascists.

Aug. 10—The Defense Ministry announces Britain has cancelled her effort to produce a tactical nuclear weapon for close army support.

Aug. 17—The government begins legal proceedings against Colin Jordan and 3 other members of the National Socialist Movement.

Aug. 23—Acting as spokesman for most British farmers, the National Farmers Union comes out against Britain's membership in the Common Market.

India

Aug. 6—Communist China accepts India's suggestion of July 26 that their boundary dispute be settled peacefully on the basis of a 1960 agreement between Indian Prime Minister Nehru and Premier Chou En-lai.

Aug. 13—Nehru tells Parliament that boundary discussions cannot start until China withdraws from territory claimed by India.

Aug. 14—The Lower House of Parliament unanimously approves the government's China policy after Nehru gives assurances nothing will be done to bring dishonor to India.

Aug. 17—Defense Minister V. K. Krishna Menon discloses that India has entered into an agreement with the U.S.S.R. for the manufacture of engines for Indian jet aircraft.

Aug. 21—Nehru introduces a bill in Parliament to create a new state of Nagaland within India.

Aug. 20—The government announces India will build a second atomic power station, in the western state of Rajasthan, at a cost of \$67 million, to be completed by 1967.

Aug. 22—Nehru discloses a military column is marching to reinforce the Indian post in the Galwan Valley that has been "besieged" by 400 Chinese troops since June 10.

Aug. 24—In London, the leader of the Naga independence movement denounces the move to establish a state of Nagaland. He says he will ask the U.N. to investigate alleged Indian atrocities against the Nagas.

Aug. 26—China charges that Indian troops fired on Chinese soldiers in disputed border areas 3 times during the last 5 days.

Jamaica

Aug. 6—After 306 years as a British possession, Jamaica becomes independent and assumes dominion status within the Commonwealth.

Malaya

Aug. 1—Britain announces that a constitutional committee will soon be formed to bring the Federation of Malaysia into existence by August, 1963. The Federation is to consist of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo.

Trinidad-Tobago

Aug. 31—With Princess Mary, the Princess Royal, and others in attendance, ceremonies are held to mark the end of colonial status, and independence within the Commonwealth for Trinidad and Tobago.

BRITISH EMPIRE, THE

Aden

Aug. 16—Agreement is reached in London on the merger of Aden with the Federation of South Arabia, known formerly as the Federation of Arab Emirates. Aden's entry is planned for next March at the latest. Britain reserves the right to take Aden from the Federation if Britain considers it desirable from a military standpoint.

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

Aug. 13—Leaders of the 5 Christian churches in Southern Rhodesia appeal to Prime Minister Sir Edgar Whitehead to postpone parliamentary action on domestic security legislation.

Aug. 21—Parliament gives initial approval to two measures aimed at curbing the Zimbabwe African People's Union.

Malta

Aug. 19—Talks in London between British officials and Prime Minister George Borg

Olivier on the island's economic problems end in disagreement.

Aug. 20—Olivier announces he has formally asked Britain to grant independence to Malta within the Commonwealth.

North Borneo

Aug. 7—Britain rejects the claim of the Philippines to North Borneo.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

(See also *British Commonwealth, India.*)

Aug. 29—China closes its border with Hong Kong minutes after a bomb explodes on the Chinese side of the border station at Shumchun. The British then close their side of the border.

COLOMBIA

Aug. 7—Dr. Guillermo León Valencia, a member of the Conservative party, is sworn in as President.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE

Aug. 1—Acting U.N. Secretary General U Thant appeals to all U.N. members to exert economic pressure to restore Congolese unity and suggests that the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga withhold further payments to Katanga until it rejoins the Republic. Last year Union Minière paid \$40 million to Katanga in taxes and dividends.

Aug. 6—On the initiative of the Central Congolese government, all air traffic over Katanga except for U.N. planes is banned.

Aug. 7—The Leopoldville government warns foreign business concerns with dealings in both Katanga and the Congo that they must choose one side or the other. It also moves to sever Katanga's telecommunications and radio links with the outside world.

Aug. 9—The U.S. submits to the U.N. a plan to persuade Katanga to accept federal union with Leopoldville. Backed by Britain and Belgium, the measures stop short of economic sanctions.

Aug. 21—President Moïse Tshombe says his Katanga regime will consider reintegration with the Congo only as "an autonomous regime" under a new federal constitution.

Aug. 24—Robert Gardiner, head of the U.N. Congo operations, presents to Katanga U Thant's proposals for ending Katanga's secession. The plan calls for an immediate 50-50 split of Katanga's revenue and reunification of the two armies. Katanga is given 10 days to agree to the plan.

Aug. 30—Ending a 5-day visit to the Soviet Union, U.N. Acting Secretary General U Thant declares that if the Russians fully understood the situation in the Congo, they would be willing to support the U.N. action there.

CUBA

Aug. 14—A confidential government report, written in April, discloses that Cuba will have no sugar to sell on the world market next year and in 1964 because of production failures.

Aug. 18—Premier Fidel Castro announces that henceforth agriculture will be based completely on collectives and that the co-operatives owned by the peasants will be turned into "state farms."

Aug. 21—The government suspends for 15 days the head of the nationalized sugar industry and 4 others for illegally "altering" supply data for their operations.

Aug. 24—U.S. officials report that since late July at least 20 Soviet cargo ships and an unspecified number of passenger ships have arrived at Cuban ports.

Aug. 30—Castro's government issues a decree declaring that wage increases must be approved by the Labor Ministry and providing for stricter working conditions.

Aug. 31—The White House announces that a U.S. navy plane was fired on yesterday near Cuba by 2 naval vessels believed to be Cuban. The U.S. government protests to Cuba.

DENMARK

Aug. 31—Premier Viggo Kampmann resigns for reasons of health. The majority Social Democratic party names Foreign Minister Jens Otto Krag as his successor.

ECUADOR

Aug. 23—In the latest in a series of strikes

and riots, police and troops use tear gas to break up disturbances in Guayaquil as bank workers strike.

Aug. 24—The cabinet of President Carlos Julio Arosemena resigns after congressional leaders suggest reorganization to meet labor and economic problems.

FRANCE

Aug. 10—A warrant is issued in Paris for the arrest of Georges Bidault, accused of plotting against the state. The former premier is believed to have escaped from the country.

Aug. 17—Terrorist activity resumes as a heavily armed commando unit raids a barracks of the special security police 19 miles east of Paris.

Aug. 22—President Charles de Gaulle escapes death as sub-machine guns fire at his car.

Aug. 29—De Gaulle authorizes increased security measures to protect his life from assassination attempts. De Gaulle tells the Cabinet that he will take steps to insure his succession.

GERMANY, EAST (Democratic Republic of)

(See also *International, Berlin Crisis*.)

Aug. 1—Communist Party leader Walter Ulbricht and Acting Premier Willy Stoph fly to Moscow.

Aug. 9—Writing in *Izvestia*, the official Soviet newspaper, Stoph declares that the signing of a German peace treaty can no longer be postponed. He asserts such a treaty must provide for the conversion of West Berlin into a demilitarized free city.

GERMANY, WEST (Federal Republic of)

(See also *International, Berlin Crisis*.)

Aug. 3—Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss is quoted in a Frankfort paper as saying "wishes" have been expressed in Washington for increasing Germany's armed forces from 500,000 to 750,000. Strauss terms this goal "absolutely unrealistic."

Aug. 8—Washington officials deny that the U.S. has requested an increase in Bonn's military strength.

Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder indicates that Bonn will break diplomatic relations with any country endorsing a peace treaty between East Germany and the Soviet Union.

HAITI

Aug. 8—For undisclosed reasons, Brigadier General Jean-René Boucicaut, head of the armed forces, takes asylum in the Venezuelan Embassy.

HONDURAS

Aug. 12—During a municipal election campaign, 2 persons are killed in clashes between officials and civilians at Juticalpa.

HUNGARY

Aug. 19—It is officially disclosed that Premier Janos Kadar has expelled from the Socialist Workers Party 25 pro-Stalinists, including former party chiefs Ernoe Gero and Matyas Rakosi.

Aug. 22—Reliable sources in Vienna report that the regime of Premier Kadar has smashed a revolt by high government officials and some generals. Deputy Interior Minister Antal Bartos is said to have been the leader and to have tried to enlist Communist Chinese aid. Imre Doegei, a former Agriculture Minister, and Koroly Dapsi, a Deputy Defense Minister, are reported under arrest.

Aug. 24—Hungary denies reports of a conspiracy against the Kadar regime and says none of the officials mentioned in the Vienna report have been arrested.

INDONESIA

Aug. 15—At the U.N., Indonesian and Dutch representatives sign an agreement to transfer to Indonesia the administration of West New Guinea (West Irian). The U.N. is to administer the territory from October 1 until May 1, when responsibility is to be transferred to Jakarta.

IRAN

Aug. 24—U.S. Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson arrives in Teheran for a 2-day good-will visit.

IRAQ

(See also *Int'l.*, *Arab League* and *Turkey*.)

Aug. 4—Premier Abdul Karim Kassim orders troops to Syria's eastern frontier to support that country against the United Arab Republic.

Aug. 7—The U.S. announces that John Jernegan has resigned as Ambassador to Iraq at the request of the Iraqi government because of U.S. recognition of the independence of Kuwait.

JAPAN

Aug. 24—The U.S. State Department announces Japan has agreed to reduce or halt temporarily the export of more than 6 types of cotton goods to the U.S.

JORDAN

Aug. 29—King Saud of Saudi Arabia and King Hussein of Jordan, in a joint communiqué published today following a 3-day meeting, declare their agreement on merging their military troops and economic policies.

KOREA, SOUTH

Aug. 20—Former Premier John M. Chang, accused of assisting in a plot against the ruling junta, goes on trial before a military court.

LAOS

Aug. 23—Premier Souvanna Phouma's cabinet agrees on 3 exit points for the evacuation of foreign troops. They are Vientiane for foreign troops with the Right-wing faction; the Plaine des Jarres for troops with the neutrals; Nhommarat for those with the pro-Communist Pathet Lao forces. All foreign troops are to leave the country by October 8.

LEBANON

Aug. 23—U. S. Vice President Johnson arrives in Beirut on his good-will tour of the Middle East.

PERU

Aug. 17—The U.S. resumes diplomatic rela-

tions with Peru and announces the resumption of economic aid while withholding military assistance.

PHILIPPINES, THE

(See *British Empire*, *North Borneo*.)

POLAND

Aug. 12—The Roman Catholic Primate of Poland, Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, accuses state authorities of having closed 3 convents and nurseries in violation of Poland's Constitution.

Aug. 13—The Office of Religious Cults announces that all schools and orphanages run by monks and nuns will be taken over by the Education Ministry within a year.

PORTUGAL

Aug. 25—It is reported that Lisbon has handed the U.S. a memorandum of items Portugal wishes discussed in negotiations for renewal of the agreement for U.S. bases in the Azores. Portugal is said to have asked for U.S. understanding at the U.N. for Lisbon's African colonial policy.

Angola

Aug. 7—The two major nationalist groups in exile begin talks at Leopoldville in an attempt to find a common basis for operations.

Aug. 20—The National Front for the Liberation of Angola announces it has established on Congolese territory a military training camp for Angolan rebels.

SPAIN

Aug. 10—The government publishes a decree lifting many controls and restrictions on industrial activity.

Aug. 19—A bomb explodes outside the summer residence of Generalissimo Francisco Franco; no one is injured.

Aug. 24—Rapidly spreading strikes in the Asturian coal region result in 13,000 miners leaving their jobs to demand the immediate introduction of the 5-day week.

SYRIA

(See *Int'l.*, *Arab League* and *Iraq*.)

THAILAND

- Aug. 11—Thai and Cambodian forces clash near the disputed frontier region.
- Aug. 13—Following a second clash between Cambodian and Thai troops, Bangkok accuses Cambodia of "direct acts of aggression."

TURKEY

- Aug. 15—The Defense Ministry reports that Iraqi planes have attacked a border area, killing two Turkish soldiers and causing widespread strafing damage.
- Aug. 16—Turkish jet planes shoot down an Iraqi jet after it crosses Turkey's border.
- Aug. 18—Iraq charges Turkish violations of Iraqi airspace.
- Aug. 20—Denying Iraqi allegations, the Foreign Ministry announces that Turkey, "in the interest of good neighborly relations," is withdrawing jet patrols from the Iraqi frontier area.
- Aug. 23—Turkey recalls its ambassador from Iraq.
- Aug. 24—Turkey offers to submit its border violation dispute with Iraq to an international commission for arbitration.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, THE

(See also *Int'l., Arab League.*)

- Aug. 7—Britain and the U.A.R. sign an agreement covering the transfer of funds and compensation for property of British nationals seized after the 1956 Suez crisis.

U.S.S.R., THE

(See also *Int'l., Berlin Crisis* and *Disarmament.*)

- Aug. 5—The U.S.S.R. resumes its nuclear tests with a high-altitude blast thought to be in the 40-megaton range.
- Aug. 7—The government decrees a gradual abolition of one-family homes in urban communities, to be replaced by cooperative apartment houses.
- Aug. 11—The Soviet Union launches its third astronaut, Major Andrian G. Nikolayev, into space.
- Aug. 12—Lieutenant Colonel Pavel R. Popovich becomes the second Soviet astronaut

sent into space within 24 hours. The astronauts, in adjacent orbits, communicate with one another and with ground stations and are seen by television audiences in the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.

- Aug. 15—The two Soviet space ships land in the Kazakhstan desert after record-breaking flights. Nikolayev circled the earth 64 times in 95 hours; Popovich orbited 48 times in 71 hours.
- Aug. 16—Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, Soviet Defense Minister, asserts that recent Russian space flights should serve as a warning to the enemies of the U.S.S.R.
- Aug. 31—The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Nasa) confirms reports from government sources that the Soviet Union unsuccessfully tried to orbit a Venus space shot on August 25, and that 3 pieces of the vehicle are orbiting earth.

UNITED STATES, THE

Agriculture

- Aug. 8—Agriculture Secretary Orville Freeman orders a referendum of wheat growers August 20 on invoking rigid marketing quotas.
- Aug. 28—Members of the National Farmers Organization vote to withhold hogs, sheep, cattle and grain from the market until processors agree to pay higher prices.

Civil Rights

- Aug. 28—The Justice Department files suit asking the federal courts to strike down two sections of the Mississippi Constitution and 6 of its state laws, allegedly aimed at keeping Negroes from voting.

The Economy

- Aug. 1—The national rate of unemployment drops two-tenths of one per cent from June to July, to 5.3 per cent, the lowest rate since May, 1960.
- Aug. 13—The Commerce Department reports that the gross national product rose to a record annual rate of \$552 billion in the quarter ending June 30, or \$7 billion above the rate for the first quarter.
- Aug. 20—The Treasury Department reveals

that the total national debt has reached \$300 billion.

Aug. 27—The cost of living in July rises 0.2 per cent over June, to a record high index of 105.5 per cent.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Int'l., Berlin Crisis and Disarmament.*)

Aug. 10—Former President Herbert Hoover proposes the formation of a "Council of Free Nations" to preserve peace when the U.N. cannot do so.

Aug. 22—Vice-President Lyndon Johnson leaves for a 19-day goodwill trip to the Middle East, Turkey, Greece and Italy.

Government

Aug. 5—Kennedy appoints to the Atomic Energy Commission James T. Ramey, executive director of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, and John G. Palfrey, dean of Columbia College.

Aug. 9—Anthony J. Celebrezze, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, announces proposed stiffer regulations for the testing of new drugs.

Aug. 11—Charles E. Bohlen is named ambassador to France.

Aug. 13—In a nationwide address, Kennedy says an immediate tax cut is unnecessary and undesirable. He says he will submit to Congress next year a basic tax reform program.

Aug. 14—For the first time in 35 years, the Senate votes for cloture, thus ending the filibuster against the communications bill. Senator Estes Kefauver, Democrat of Tennessee, says he will seek contempt-of-Congress citations against 4 steel companies for refusing to give his Antitrust and Monopoly subcommittee cost data figures.

Aug. 23—The Senate unanimously approves a bill to tighten federal drug laws.

Aug. 24—The Senate passes and sends to the White House a bill authorizing \$73 million to the Philippines for World War II damage.

Aug. 25—Kennedy names J. C. Corbett to be

the U.S. director of the International Monetary Fund.

Aug. 27—The House completes congressional action and sends to the states a constitutional amendment outlawing the poll tax for federal elections.

Aug. 30—Kennedy names Under Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz as Secretary of Labor to succeed Arthur J. Goldberg. (See also *Supreme Court.*)

Aug. 31—President Kennedy signs the communications satellite bill establishing a joint government-industry corporation to develop international television communications by means of Telstar satellites.

Labor

Aug. 6—The railroads withdraw their proposals of last month, based on a presidential commission's recommendations for new work rules. The carriers insist upon their 1959 proposals, calling for the elimination of 40,000 firemen from Diesel locomotives.

Aug. 10—A federal judge grants 5 rail unions a temporary injunction against a management proposal to alter work rules significantly.

Aug. 13—The executive council of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations decides to seek a 35-hour week.

Aug. 30—The Order of Railroad Telegraphers union strikes for greater job security guarantees, causing a shutdown on the Chicago and North Western railway, third largest in the country. Over 15,000 other employees refuse to cross the picket lines.

Military Affairs

Aug. 9—Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor tells Congress that as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he will not "crusade" for the Pentagon reorganization he once advocated. The Senate unanimously confirms his appointment and the nomination of General Earle G. Wheeler as Army Chief of Staff.

Aug. 10—Kennedy signs a bill appropriating \$48 billion for the armed forces in the cur-

rent fiscal year, \$229 million more than requested by the Administration.

Aug. 19—Senator Howard Cannon, Democrat of Nevada, charges that civilian officials in the Pentagon have delayed programs to exploit space exploration for military purposes.

Aug. 22—Kennedy acknowledges that the U.S. is "well behind" the Soviet Union in the space race but insists that by the end of the decade the U.S. will be far ahead.

Aug. 26—A House Armed Services subcommittee unanimously demands that the Pentagon drop most of its Reserve plans and develop a better program to cure weaknesses uncovered by the limited call-up last year.

Aug. 27—The Mariner II is launched on a 180-million-mile trip toward Venus.

Segregation

Aug. 6—The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals orders all racial restrictions removed from the first, second and third grades of New Orleans public schools by September, 1962.

Aug. 8—The Justice Department files a friend-of-the-court brief opposing the request of Albany, Georgia, for an injunction banning further protests against segregation.

Aug. 10—The Rev. Martin Luther King is freed from an Albany jail after serving 2 weeks. Negro leaders call off 2 scheduled protest demonstrations.

Aug. 28—Jails in Albany and surrounding Georgia towns are filled as 75 clergy and lay leaders from 10 states are arrested after an attempted prayer vigil.

Aug. 31—In Buras, Louisiana, Roman Catholic Church officials close Our Lady of Good Harbor School. The school was desegregated 2 days ago, when 5 Negro and 38 white children attended classes. Church officials declare that classes have been cancelled because of the many threats of violence.

Supreme Court

Aug. 29—President Kennedy announces the

resignation of Supreme Court Associate Justice Felix Frankfurter after 23 years of service for reasons of health. Kennedy appoints Labor Secretary Arthur J. Goldberg to this post.

VENEZUELA

Aug. 1—The government restores constitutional guarantees suspended since the May 4 uprising against the regime. The restoration does not affect a decree of May 9 suspending the activities of the Communist party and the Marxist Movement of the Revolutionary Left.

VIETNAM, SOUTH

Aug. 19—U.S. officials in Saigon disclose that South Vietnam is embarking on a large-scale program of deficit financing to help pay for the increasingly costly fight against the Viet Cong (Communist) rebels.

Aug. 20—Viet Cong guerrillas escape a massive 4-day government offensive in the southern swamplands.

YEMEN

(See also *British Empire, Aden.*)

Aug. 17—The government accuses Britain of sponsoring the merger of the British colony of Aden with the Federation of South Arabia only to "prolong and strengthen" Britain's hold on the area.

YUGOSLAVIA

Aug. 13—A recent session of the Communist party's Central Committee is informed that real personal earnings were 4 per cent lower in the first 5 months of 1962 than during a corresponding period last year. The cut amounts to 10 per cent of the average real personal earnings for all of 1961.

Aug. 15—Reports from Belgrade say the government, faced with its third straight unsuccessful harvest, has decided to take direct action to enlarge the "Socialist sector" of agriculture. The specific target will be the peasants who work at other jobs in addition to farming small landholdings.

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